Calendrier du 30 novembre 2020
Paris Migration Seminar
Du 30/11/2020 de 17:30 à 18:20
ARELLANO-BOVER Jaime (Yale University)
The Role of Firms in the Assimilation of Immigrants
écrit avec with Shmuel San
This paper studies the role of firms in immigrants’ labor market assimilation. We do so in the context of a large and sudden international migration shock: the arrival of nearly one million former Soviet Union (FSU) Jews to Israel in the 1990s. We use newly avail- able Israeli population employer-employee data with information on workers’ place of birth and immigration year. Over the course of twenty-five years since arrival to Is- rael, immigrants gradually enter higher-paying, larger, older, and less segregated firms. Gradual access to higher-paying firms explains a significant fraction of immigrants’ labor market assimilation. Firm-specific pay premiums account for (i) 10–12% of the immigrant-native salary differential in the first ten years since arrival, and (ii) 28% of the gap between immigrants’ own salary one and twenty-five years since arrival. FSU immigrants, who were highly educated, surpass natives after twenty years in Israel in terms of their employers’ pay premiums, size, and age. An implication of our find- ings is that a significant fraction of the immigrant-native wage gap, especially shortly after arrival, is due to immigrants finding jobs at small, new, and disproportionately low-paying firms.
Roy Seminar (ADRES)
Du 30/11/2020 de 17:00 à 18:00
online
CARROLL Gabriel (Stanford University)
Dynamic Incentives in Incompletely Specified Environments
Consider a repeated interaction where it is unknown which of various stage games will be played each period. This framework captures the logic of intertemporal incentives even though numeric payoffs to any strategy profile are indeterminate. A natural solution concept is ex post perfect equilibrium (XPE): strategies must form a subgame-perfect equilibrium for any realization of the sequence of stage games. When (i) there is one long-run player and others are short-run, and (ii) public randomization is available, we can adapt the standard recursive approach to determine the maximum sustainable gap between reward and punishment. This leads to an explicit characterization of what outcomes are supportable in equilibrium, and an optimal penal code that supports them. Any non-XPE-supportable outcome fails to be an SPE outcome for some (possibly ambiguous) specification of the stage games. Unlike in standard repeated games, restrictions (i) and (ii) are crucial.
Texte intégral
GSIELM (Graduate Students International Economics and Labor Market) Lunch Seminar
Du 30/11/2020 de 13:00 à 14:00
https://zoom.univ-paris1.fr/j/97965760768?pwd=cmNIcE1CK1FBY2FDamV2UmJIUXMzZz09
écrit avec Jean-Charles Bricongne (Banque de France), Margarita Lopez-Forero (France Stratégie, Dauphine)
Based on French firm-level data over 15 years we evaluate the contribution of the mi-
crolevel profit shifting –through tax haven foreign direct investments (FDI), may it be in
or outward- to the aggregate productivity slowdown in France and the role that intangible
investments play in this relation. We show that firm productivity in France experiences a
decline over the immediate years following the establishment in a tax haven, with an aver-
age estimated drop by 3.5% in labor productivity. We argue that this productivity decline,
following a presence in a tax haven, is most likely explained by MNEs’ fiscal optimization,
where domestic productivity is underestimated as profits are not recorded anymore in the
home country. The fall in productivity is especially strong for firms that are intensive in
intangible capital and is equivalent to 4.1% (versus 2.7% for low intangible intensive firms),
reflecting the fact that these type of assets are more easily transferred across countries and
facilitate fiscal optimization. Our results additionally suggest that the mismeasurement has
strong dynamic effects, as the decline becomes more important the longer the firm remains
in a tax haven. Due to possible attenuation biases, we argue that our estimates provide a
lower bound of the productivity mismeasurement. Finally, given these firms’ weight in the
economy, our results imply an 8% loss at the aggregate in terms of the level of the labor
productivity throughout the whole sample period, which is equivalent to an annual loss of
9.5% in terms of the aggregate annual labor productivity growth.
Régulation et Environnement
Du 30/11/2020 de 12:00 à 13:00
https://zoom.us/j/98281389413?pwd=cWxiVzVPdVdCYm1Ec2pDcDYybk5tQT09
RIEDEL Nadine (University of Münster)
Cross-Border Effects of R&D Tax Incentives
Existing evidence shows that R&D tax incentives boost countries' private sector R&D. As multinational enterprises (MNEs) account for nearly all private sector innovations, it is unclear, however, whether firms engage in genuinely new R&D or whether R&D is reallocated across borders. Drawing on data on unconsolidated R&D activity of MNEs in Europe, we show that R&D tax incentives serve as beggar-thy-neighbor instruments: More generous tax incentives in one country increase MNEs' R&D investments in affiliates located there, while lowering R&D investments in affiliates of the same MNE group located in other countries. Globally, firms hardly respond to changed R&D tax incentives.