Calendrier du 31 janvier 2018
Development Economics Seminar
Du 31/01/2018 de 16:30 à 18:00
campus Jourdan - 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris
CARIA Stefano (University of Oxford)
The Selection of Talent: Experimental and Structural Evidence from Ethiopia
écrit avec joint work with Girum Abebe and Esteban Ortiz-Ospina
We study how search frictions in the labour market affect firms' ability to recruit talented workers. In a field experiment in Ethiopia, we show that an employer can attract more talented applicants by offering a small monetary incentive for making a job application. The size of the effect is equivalent to doubling the wage offer for the same position. Estimates from a structural model suggest that application incentives are effective because (i) the cost of making a job application is large (on average 9-13 percent of the monthly wage), especially among talented low-income jobseekers; and (ii) 30 percent of individuals are unable to pay this cost due to credit constraints. In a second experiment, we show that local recruiters underestimate the positive impacts of application incentives. This can explain why the use of this intervention is limited in our context. Our findings highlight that financial incentives for job applications can improve the selection and allocation of talent.