Calendrier du mois de janvier 2021
Du 29/01/2021 de 13:45 à 15:00
salle R2-01, campus Jourdan - 75014 Paris
Paris Migration Seminar
Du 27/01/2021 de 17:30 à 18:30
Via Zoom
TOEWS Gerhard(New Economic School)
VEZINA Pierre-Louis (Kings College London)
Enemies of the people
Enemies of the people were the millions of artists, engineers, professors, and affluent peasants that were thought a threat to the Soviet regime for being the educated elite, and were forcedly resettled to the Gulag, i.e. the system of forced labor camps across the Soviet Union. In this paper we look at the long-run consequences of this dark re-location episode. We show that areas around camps with a larger share of enemies among camp prisoners are more prosperous today, as captured by firms' wages and profits, as well as night lights per capita. We also show that the descendants of enemies are more likely to be tertiary educated today. Our results point in the direction of a long-run persistence of education and a resulting positive effect on local economic outcomes. A 28 percentage point increase in the share of enemies increases night lights per capita by 58%, profits per employee by 65%, and average wages by 22%.
Histoire des entreprises et de la finance
Du 27/01/2021 de 17:00 à 18:30
via Zoom
AVARO Maylis (Graduate Institute, Genève)
Zombie International Currency, the pound sterling, 1945-1971
This paper provides new evidence on the decline of sterling as an international currency, focusing on its role as foreign exchange reserve asset under the Bretton Woods era. Using a unique new dataset on the composition of foreign exchange reserves of central banks, I show that the shift away from the sterling occurred earlier than conventionally supposed for the countries not belonging to the sterling area. The use of sterling has been described as freely chosen, imposed by the Bank of England or negotiated. I argue that the sterling area was a captive market as the Bank of England used capital controls, commercial threats and economic sanctions against sterling area countries to limit the divestments of their sterling assets. This management of the decline of sterling benefited mostly Britain and the City of London but represented a cost for sterling area countries and the international monetary system.
Texte intégral
PSI-PSE (Petit Séminaire Informel de la Paris School of Economics) Seminar
Du 26/01/2021 de 17:00 à 18:00
Zoom: https://zoom.us/j/97117933045?pwd=VG5oY0RDaWJMbmtSY2o3Y2F5RkZxZz09
GRIMEE Juliane (PSE)
Pigovian taxation with bunching of low taxes
Regional and urban economics seminar
Du 26/01/2021 de 16:00 à 18:00
On line
PROGRAMME
16:00 Lecture 1 : Eric Chyn (Dartmouth College)
Title : “Moved to Vote : The Long-Run Effects of Neighborhoods on Political Participation, with Kareem Haggag (Carnegie Mellon University)
Discussant : Camille Hémet (ENS-Paris School of Economics)
17:00 Virtual coffee break
17:30 Lecture 2 : Jean Lacroix (University Paris-Saclay)
Title : “Ballots instead of bullets ? The effects of the voting right acts on political violence
Discussant : Arianna Ornaghi (University of Warwick)
The expected duration of the lectures is 40 minutes, and there are 10 minutes for discussions and 10 minutes for questions from the rest of the audience.
Applied Economics Lunch Seminar
Du 26/01/2021 de 12:30 à 13:30
BHARTI Nitin (PSE)
Human Capital Accumulation in China and India: 1900-2020
écrit avec Li Yang
In this paper we study the evolution of modern education in China and India and compare several quantitative and qualitative educational outcomes in the last 100-120 years. The interesting patterns we highlight are: China’s bottom-up approach versus India’s top-down approach, China's broad-based vocational education whereas poorly developed vocational education system of India, China producing more engineering graduates versus India producing more humanities graduates. We conjecture that engineering and vocational graduates helped China in developing the manufacturing sector, whereas elitist education of India created a niche economic sector like IT. Further we show a high skill premium for higher education in India compared to China is fuelling more income inequality in India.
Paris Migration Seminar
Du 25/01/2021 de 17:30 à 18:20
via Zoom
DELGADO-PRIETO Lukas (UC3M)
Dynamics of Local Wages and Employment: Evidence from the Venezuelan Immigration in Colombia
The unprecedented socioeconomic and political deterioration of Venezuela has triggered a massive outflow of people leaving the country since 2016, both in a voluntary and a forced manner. Colombia has been the major receiver country with more than 1.2 million working-age Venezuelans (4.1% of the working-age population living in Colombia) as of 2019. I use this quasi-natural experiment to identify the causal impact of the Venezuelan immigration on the Colombian labor market. To analyze dynamic treatment effects I implement an event-study design with two different shift-share instruments. For both instruments I find that immigration from Venezuela had a highly negative short-run effect on local native wages since 2017, and the impact is mainly suffered by less skilled workers and workers without access to social security. Moreover, wages in lower percentiles of the native local wage distribution are severely more affected compared to those in upper percentiles. In terms of native employment, I find a delayed negative response after controlling for preexisting trends. On aggregate, the supply shock affected mainly the informal labor market with lower wages and higher employment on average.
GSIELM (Graduate Students International Economics and Labor Market) Lunch Seminar
Du 25/01/2021 de 13:00 à 14:00
https://zoom.univ-paris1.fr/j/99471949261?pwd=TW5RRDRrc2xOUXh0UjEzc1pkRy8wQT09
GUEDIDI Insaf (University of Tunis, ESSECT, DEFI,University of Paris 1)
Trade Facilitation and Participation in Global Value Chains
écrit avec Leila Baghdadi (University of Tunis, ESSECT, DEFI, World Trade Organization Chair at University of Tunis) and Inmaculada Martínez Zarzoso (University of Gottingen, University Jaume I)
This paper investigates the effect of trade facilitation on forward and backward Global Value Chains (GVCs) in manufacturing sectors. We use a two-step gravity model of trade for a cross-section of countries over the period 2004-2015. The main aim is to shed some light on whether the effect of maritime connectivity and border procedures on value-added content of trade differ by region. Results indicate that maritime connectivity matters for trade under GVCs. In particular, exporting intermediate goods is highly encouraged by more efficient maritime routes which connect different participants of GVCs in Africa and Asia. Furthermore, shipping goods without delays, low costs and simpler procedures are key determinants of participation in forward GVCs. Finally, the regional analysis for manufacturing sectors of GVCs helps to discern which regions are more affected by cross-border reforms and reveals that simplifying documentary procedures is important for Africa, Asia and Europe when they import foreign value-added. For instance, less time to import encourages Africa to participate in backward linkages in GVCs and transportation costs matter for Africa when it operates upstream tasks and for Europe when it operates upstream and downstream tasks.
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Du 25/01/2021 de 11:00 à 12:00
on line
JAIN Atulya ()
Dynamic cheap talk with no feedback
We study a dynamic sender-receiver game, where the sequence of states follows a Markov chain. The sender provides valuable information but gets no feedback on the receiver’s actions. Under certain assumptions, we characterize the set of uniform equilibrium payoffs with the help of a static cheap talk game, where the marginal distribution of messages is fixed. We show that the sender is able to bridge the value of commitment and secure the Bayesian persuasion payoff of the static game.
Paris Migration Seminar
Du 20/01/2021 de 17:30 à 18:30
via Zoom
ANELLI Massimo (Bocconi University)
Geographic sorting and aversion to breaking rules
écrit avec Tommaso Colussi and Andrea Ichino
The level of Aversion to Breaking Rules (ABR) is heterogeneous across nearby localities in many areas of the world and geographic sorting based on ABR maybe a reason. In this paper we use Italian Census restricted data to construct an indicator of cheating in the registration of birth dates, separately for migrants and remainers at the city/time level in Italy so that we can measure sorting based on ABR between the North and the South of the country. A simple theoretical model predicts that the fraction of ABR agents is higher in the group where less cheating is observed and where a change of deterrence induces a smaller absolute change in observed cheating. In light of the model, we first show that, within narrowly defined localities, migrants from South to North are less likely to cheat on their birthdate than remainers in the South, while the opposite is observed for migrants from North to South versus remainers in the North. We then exploit an institutional reform implemented by Fascism in 1926 to study how cheating on the date of birth reacts to changes in deterrence. The reactions of cheating to these changes in deterrence were smaller for migrants out of the South than for remainers in the South. We therefore conclude that Italy experienced sorting based on ABR between the North and the South and that the South suffered an ABR drain because of the internal migration movements of the 20th century. Finally, we show that localities experiencing a greater ABR drain display lower labor productivity in recent decades.
Applied Economics Lunch Seminar
Du 19/01/2021 de 12:30 à 13:30
ANDREESCU Marie (PSE)
Labor facing capital in the workplace: the fate of worker representatives
écrit avec with Jérôme Bourdieu, Vladimir Pecheu
The paper studies how the personal career of union (or worker) representatives is tied to the conditions in which revenues are shared between labor and capital at the firm-level. We argue that employers can have a strategic interest in either favoring or discriminating against union representatives in order to lower workers’ bargaining power. The first strategy (favoritism) amounts to “buying the social peace” and can only be implemented with willing representatives. The second (discrimination) is a way to stigmatize vindictive representatives and curb their demands, notably by discouraging other workers to join the union. The behavior of union representatives during firm negotiations and the stake of those negotiations will influence employers’ willingness to use one or the other of those strategies. This is confirmed by data for France in 2017: for example, union representatives that are most active during their mandate or represent the most campaigning unions have much worse careers than their colleagues, while those that do not participate in strikes experience a large wage premium. Workers are also more likely not to join a union because they fear for their career in firms where union representatives are penalized. Based on the theory and the results, we conclude that the employer ability to substantially affect representatives’ careers can seriously impair the quality of workers’ representation and workers’ ability to organize collectively in order to take effectively part in the firm decision-making process.
Paris Migration Seminar
Du 18/01/2021 de 17:30 à 18:20
via Zoom
GAZEAUD Jules (NOVAFRICA)
Cash Transfers and Migration: Theory and Evidence from a Randomized ControlledTrial
écrit avec Eric Mvukiyehe and Olivier Sterck
Will the fast expansion of cash-based programming in developing countries increase international migration? Theoretically, cash transfers may foster international migration by relaxing liquidity, credit, and risk constraints. But transfers, especially those conditional upon staying at home, may also increase the opportunity cost of migrating abroad. This paper evaluates the impact of a cash-for-work program on migration. Randomly selected households in Comoros were offered up to US$320 in cash in exchange for their participation in public works projects. We find that the program increased international migration by 38 percent, from 7.8 percent to 10.8 percent. The increase in migration appears to be driven by the alleviation of liquidity and risk constraints, and by the fact that the program did not increase the opportunity cost of migration for likely migrants.
Paris Migration Seminar
Du 13/01/2021 de 17:30 à 18:30
via Zoom
TEYTELBOYM Alexander (University of Oxford)
An Adaptive Targeted Field Experiment: Job Search Assistance for Refugees in Jordan
écrit avec Stefano Caria, Grant Gordon, Maximilian Kasy, Simon Quinn and Soha Shami
We introduce a novel methodology for adaptive targeted experiments. Our Tempered Thompson Algorithm balances the goals of maximizing the precision of treatment effect estimates and maximizing the welfare of experimental participants. A hierarchical Bayesian model allows us to adaptively target treatments at different groups. We implement our methodology in a field experiment. We examine the impact of three interventions designed to improve formal employment outcomes of Syrian refugees and local jobseekers in Jordan: one treatment to address liquidity constraints, one to address information frictions, and one to address challenges of self-control. Six weeks after being offered treatment, none of the interventions has a significant or meaningful impact on the probability that individuals are in wage employment; we estimate that our targeting algorithm had a positive but small effect on aggregate employment (approximately 1 percentage point). However, we find large employment effects of all treatments for refugees at the two-month follow-up, and suggestive evidence of four-month impacts for the cash grant; liquidity appears to be a key barrier to employment for refugees.
Economic History Seminar
Du 13/01/2021 de 12:30 à 14:00
Via Zoom
LEROUXEL Francois (Univ. Paris-Sorbonne)
ZURBACH Julien(ENS)
Le changement dans les économies antiques
Le changement dans les économies anciennes, rassemble des contributions issues de plusieurs années de travail en groupe. Historiens, archéologues et environnementalistes ont travaillé ensemble sur quelques produits essentiels aux économies antiques. Ils ouvrent un nouveau type de dialogue interdisciplinaire, permettant de dépasser des oppositions anciennes (entre primitivistes et modernistes, partisans de la stagnation et de la croissance).
PSI-PSE (Petit Séminaire Informel de la Paris School of Economics) Seminar
Du 12/01/2021 de 17:00 à 18:00
Zoom : https://zoom.us/j/97117933045?pwd=VG5oY0RDaWJMbmtSY2o3Y2F5RkZxZz09
LOBECK Max ( University of Konstanz)
Motivating Beliefs in a Just World
Applied Economics Lunch Seminar
Du 12/01/2021 de 12:30 à 13:30
DARCILLON Thibault ()
The Brahmin Left, the Merchant Right, and the Bloc Bourgeois
écrit avec Bruno Amable (Université de Genève)
In a recent paper, Piketty (2018) argues that the vote for the left in France, the UK and the USA tends increasingly to be associated with a high education level whereas a traditional class- or income-based divide separated left from right individuals in the 1950s and 1960s. The current situation would be characterized by a dominance of “elites” in left and right constituencies: financially rich elites vote for the right (merchant right), high-education elites vote for the left (brahmin left). Using ISSP data for 17 countries, this paper tests the influence of income and education inequalities on political leaning and a variety of policy preferences: the support for redistribution, for investment in public education, for globalisation and immigration. Results show that income levels are still relevant for the left-right divide, but the influence differs across education levels. Our findings also point to a certain convergence of opinion among the Brahmin left and the merchant right, which could lead to a new political divide beyond the left and the right, uniting a bloc bourgeois.
Paris Migration Seminar
Du 11/01/2021 de 17:30 à 18:20
via Zoom
LUKSIC Juan ()
Can immigration affect neighborhood effects? Accounting for the indirect effects of immigrants on native test scores
Migratory waves can affect native students through immigrant peer effects. But immigration and native response can also change neighborhoods. In this paper, I compare two different methods to analyze the impact of immigration on children test scores and show that broader changes in the neighborhood can indeed be important. I study this question by focusing on 4th-grade test scores in the context of the recent migratory phenomenon in Chile, where, from 2012 to 2019, the immigrant population increased from nearly 1% to 8%. Following Chetty and Hendren’s (2018a, 2018b) methodology, I estimate the effect of each municipality on test scores using a fixed effect regression model identified by students who move across municipalities at different ages. Then, I construct a shift-share instrument by taking shares from the 2002 census and estimate the impact of immigrant arrivals on the municipality effects. On average, I find a negative impact of foreign students on the municipality effects. My estimation suggests that a 1 standard deviation increase in the proportion of immigrant students in a municipality causes 1 percentile decrease in student test scores per year spent. Then, I estimate immigrant peer effect (Hoxby, 2000). I find a precise null effect using comparison across school cohorts and classes. These results suggest that migration may affect natives through indirect effects. In fact, the presence of native flights and an increase in socioeconomic segregation across schools fuel the indirect effect hypothesis.
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Du 11/01/2021 de 11:00 à 12:00
Zoom : https://hec-fr.zoom.us/j/95796468806 ID de réunion : 957 9646 8806
GAUBERT Stéphane (INRIA, CMAP, Ecole Polytechnique)
The geometry of fixed points sets of Shapley operators
écrit avec Marianne Akian and Sara Vannucci
Shapley operators of undiscounted zero-sum two-player games are order-preserving maps that commute with the addition of a constant. The fixed points of these Shapley operators play a key role in the study of games with mean payoff: the existence of a fixed point is guaranteed by ergodicity conditions, moreover, fixed points that are distinct (up to an additive constant) determine distinct optimal stationary strategies. We provide a series of characterizations of fixed point sets of Shapley operators in finite dimension (i.e., for games with a finite state space). Some of these characterizations are of a lattice theoretical nature, whereas some other rely on metric geometry and tropical geometry. More precisely, we show that fixed point sets of Shapley operators are special instances of hyperconvex spaces (non-expansive retracts of sup-norm spaces) that are lattices in the induced partial order. They are also characterized by a property of ``best co-approximation'' arising in the theory of nonexpansive retracts of Banach spaces. Moreover, they retain properties of convex sets, with a notion of ``convex hull'' defined only up to isomorphism. We finally examine the special case of deterministic games with finite action spaces. Then, fixed point sets have a structure of polyhedral complexes, which include as special cases tropical polyhedra. These complexes have a cell decomposition attached to stationary strategies of the players, in which each cell is an alcoved polyhedron of An type.
Casual Friday Development Seminar - Brown Bag Seminar
Du 08/01/2021 de 12:45 à 13:45
Using Zoom
CRESPIN-BOUCAUD Juliette (PSE)
Interethnic marriages in Kenya
Applied Economics Lunch Seminar
Du 05/01/2021 de 12:30 à 13:30
RO'EE LEVY Jonathan (Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics)
If you build it, will they come? Equilibrium effects of subsidizing housing supply
To reduce rents without stifling housing investment, governments increasingly subsidize privately owned rental housing, conditional on affordability. A simple model suggests that these policies may trigger new investment, but have heterogeneous effects across locations. I exploit quasi-experimental evidence from a tax break for individual landlords in France, and nationwide administrative data covering the universe of transaction deeds, property registries, and building permits. I show that subsidizing private rental housing increased new dwelling sales, promoted additional construction, and shifted the composition of the local housing stock towards rental and multi-family units. Preliminary evidence suggests it may have raised employment, in-migration, and social diversity in targeted areas. However, it led to substantial capitalization into land prices and developer profits, and increased urban sprawl. I plan to use the quasi-experimental results to quantify optimal tax expenditures in spatial equilibrium, where housing subsidies may help correct labor or housing market distortions, but exhibit regressive properties and significant deadweight losses.
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Du 04/01/2021 de 11:00 à 12:00
RAGEL Thomas (CEREMADE, Dauphine PSL)
TBA
Regional and urban economics seminar
Du 04/01/2021
MSE – Room: tbc 106-112 boulevard de l’hôpital, 75013 Paris
CHOR Davin (SINGAPORE)
Régulation Urbain