Calendrier du mois de octobre 2017
PSI-PSE (Petit Séminaire Informel de la Paris School of Economics) Seminar
Du 31/10/2017 de 17:00 à 18:00
HE Yinghua (Rice U)
Teacher Absence, Substitutability and Productivity: Evidence from Teachers
Applied Economics Lunch Seminar
Du 31/10/2017 de 12:30 à 13:30
Salle R2-01, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
RANJBAR RAVASAN Farshad (PSE)
The excess burden of collateral
Developing a model of adverse selection with heterogeneous borrowers across risk and return dimensions, this paper shows that in developing countries that have poor institutional quality of collateral and bankruptcy laws, the aggressive collateralization makes the risk taking behavior of borrowers suboptimally more costly. This discourages entrepreneurship activities and thus hinders the potential growth among young firms with high impact on job creation in the economy. I provide the empirical evidence by investigating the performance of 76 cohorts of firms that entered the market between 1934 to 2009 during the fiscal year of 2012 in four MENA economies with weak collateral and bankruptcy laws. Matching data on the location of firms and bank branches, I construct the index for local collateral policy that prevails in the vicinity of each firm. I find that new enterprises expand their employment faster when they are located in areas in which banks with less stringent collateral policy have a stronger presence. They are also less likely to be discouraged from applying for a loan, more likely to have access to bank finance and more likely to make investments.
Casual Friday Development Seminar - Brown Bag Seminar
Du 27/10/2017 de 12:45 à 13:45
Salle R2-01, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
OLCKERS Matthew (PSE)
Friend-based targeting
EPCI (Economie politique du changement institutionnel) Seminar
Du 27/10/2017 de 11:00 à 12:30
MSE - PARIS 1- SALLE 116
BECKER Maja (Université de Toulouse )
Mind the Income Gaps? The lasting effect of information on redistributive preferences
Individuals reject economic inequality if they believe it to result from unequal opportunities. This paper argues income gaps between inborn groups, such as gender or race, serve people as an indication of unequal opportunities. Findings from a survey experiment show Americans underestimate these gaps. When confronted with accurate information participants correct their beliefs and adjust redistributive preferences. A follow-up survey finds these effects to last for over one year and to induce the same preference changes across the ideological divide. In sum, this paper contributes to political economy scholarship that links individual preferences to objective economic reality. Focusing on income gaps offers new ways to explore the political consequences of changes in the income distribution.
Texte intégral
Macroeconomics Seminar
Du 26/10/2017 de 15:30 à 16:45
PSE - 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris - salle R2-21
AGHION Philippe (Collège de France)
*Missing Growth from Creative Destruction
écrit avec Antonin Bergeaud, Timo Boppar,t Peter J. Klenow, Huiyu Li
Travail et économie publique externe
Du 26/10/2017 de 12:30 à 13:45
SEIM David (Stockholm University)
Payroll Taxes, Firm Behavior, and Rent Sharing: Evidence from a Young Workers Tax Cut in Sweden
This paper uses administrative data to analyze a large and long-lasting employer payroll tax rate cut from 31% down to 15% for young workers (aged 26 or less) in Sweden. We find a zero effect on net-of-tax wages of young treated workers relative to slightly older untreated workers, even in the medium run (after six years). Simple graphical cohort analysis shows compelling positive effects on the employment rate of the treated young workers, of about 2--3 percentage points, which arise primarily from fewer separations (rather than more hiring). These employment effects are larger in places with initially higher youth unemployment rates. We also analyze the firm-level effects of the tax cut. We trace out graphically the time series of outcomes of firms by their persistent share of treated young workers just before the reform, to which the tax cut windfall is proportionate. First, heavily treated firms expand after the reform: employment, capital, sales, value added, and profits all increase. These effects appear stronger in credit-constrained firms, consistent with liquidity effects. Second, heavily treated firms increase the wages of all their workers -- young as well as old -- collectively, perhaps through rent sharing. Wages of low paid workers rise more in percentage terms. Rather than canonical market-level adjustment, we uncover a crucial role of firm-level mechanisms in the transmission of payroll tax cuts.
Economic History Seminar
Du 25/10/2017 de 12:30 à 14:00
Salle R2-20, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
HANLON Walker (NYU Stern School of Business)
A Century of Pollution and Mortality: London, 1866-1965
Abstract:
Relatively little is known about how the effects of pollution evolve as countries develop, due in part to the scarcity of historical pollution measures. This study improves our understanding of this process by estimating the acute effects of pollution in London across the century spanning 1866-1965 using detailed new weekly mortality data. To identify pollution effects I reviewed daily weather reports for over 31,000 days to identify fog events. I show that these events substantially increased pollution concentrations and that, because they depended on a complex set of climatic conditions, their week-to-week timing was as good as random after appropriate controls are included. This allows me to explore a variety of questions related to (1) the overall impact of acute pollution effects in London across the century, (2) how this impact evolved over time, (3) how pollution effects varied across age groups, (4) how pollution interacted with infectious diseases and (5) how the reduction in infectious diseases influenced the effects of pollution overall and for different age groups.
PSI-PSE (Petit Séminaire Informel de la Paris School of Economics) Seminar
Du 24/10/2017 de 17:00 à 18:00
KHOURY Laura (Paris School of Economics)
Generosity versus Duration Trade-Off and the Optimization Ability of the Unemployed
Applied Economics Lunch Seminar
Du 24/10/2017 de 12:30 à 13:30
Salle R2-01, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
FERNANDEZ SANCHEZ Martin (LISER)
School Segregation and Long-term Happiness: Evidence from the 1981 Privatization Reform in Chile
In 1981 the Chilean Military Government introduced a new system of school financing and choice that led to an exodus of middle-class students from public to subsidized private schools. Using contemporaneous household surveys and historical administrative data of enrollment before and after the reform, I examine the long-term impact of increasing subsidized private enrollment –and thereby segregation- on subjective well-being. The results show that children from poor families were negatively affected by the policy change. On average, being exposed to a 10 percentage point increase in subsidized private enrollment during childhood is associated with a drop in adult life satisfaction of 6% of a standard deviation, an effect equivalent to a fall in household income of 30%.
Régulation et Environnement
Du 23/10/2017 de 12:00 à 13:30
Salle R2-01, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
WILLIAMS III Roberton (University of Maryland)
Unemployment and Environmental Regulation in General Equilibrium
This presentation will cover two closely related papers. The first paper analyzes the effects of environmental policy on employment (and unemployment) using a new general-equilibrium two-sector search model. We find that imposing a pollution tax causes substantial reductions in employment in the regulated (polluting) industry, but this is offset by increased employment in the unregulated (nonpolluting) sector. Thus the policy causes a substantial shift in employment between industries, but the net effect on overall employment (and unemployment) is small, even in the short run. An environmental performance standard causes a substantially smaller sectoral shift in employment than the emissions tax, with roughly similar net effects. The effects on the unregulated industry suggest that empirical studies of environmental regulation that focus only on regulated firms can be misleading (and those that use nonregulated firms as controls for regulated firms will be even more misleading). This paper’s results also suggest that overall effects on employment are not a major issue for environmental policy, and that policymakers who want to minimize sectoral shifts in employment might prefer performance standards over environmental taxes.
Casual Friday Development Seminar - Brown Bag Seminar
Du 20/10/2017 de 12:45 à 13:45
Salle R1-09, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
DUTRONC-POSTEL Paul (PSE)
Land expropriation and bureaucrat promotion in China
écrit avec Maiting Zhuang (PSE)
TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar
Du 19/10/2017 de 12:30 à 13:30
salle R2-20, campus Jourdan, 48 bd Jourdan - 75014 Paris
LOVO Stefano (HEC)
Herding and Crowdfunding (joint with Brett Green).
Abstract: We explore a sequential fund-raising mechanism with common values and an all-or-nothing clause (i.e., a target level of funds must be raised in order for the project to be implemented). We show that in the maximum truth-telling equilibria the presence of the all-or nothing clause decreases the probability of abstention cascade but it increases the probability of pledging cascades. Compared to the socially optimal outcome these campaign lead to an excessive implementation of projects. Social optimum can be restored by allowing backers to opt in and out at the end of the campaign.
Travail et économie publique externe
Du 19/10/2017 de 12:30 à 13:45
FORTIN Bernard (Université Laval)
Physicians' Response to Incentives: Evidence on Hours of Work and Multitasking
We measure the response of physicians to monetary incentives using administrative data on Quebec (Canada) specialists. Our data contain information on the different services provided by individual physicians and their hours worked. These data cover a period during which the Quebec government changed the relative prices paid for medical services. We develop a multitasking model to estimate the manner in which physicians reacted to these price changes. Optimal behaviour within our model implies a wage index that determines the marginal return to clinical hours worked when those hours are optimally distributed across services. This index, in turn, generates an earnings equation which we estimate using both limited and full-information methods. Our results confirm that physicians respond to incentives in predictable ways. The own-price substitution effects of a price change are both economically and statistically significant. Income effects are present, but small for individual services. They are more important in the presence of broad-based fee increases which can lead to physicians reducing the supply of services.
Development Economics Seminar
Du 18/10/2017 de 16:30 à 18:00
salle R2-21 campus Jourdan - 48 bd Jourdan 75014 Paris
MORTEN Melanie (Stanford University )
Migration and Consumption Insurance in Bangladesh.
Economic History Seminar
Du 18/10/2017 de 12:30 à 14:00
Salle R2-20, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
MCGAUGHEY Ewan (Kings College)
On the history of co-determination and power sharing/worker voting rights in company boards
PSI-PSE (Petit Séminaire Informel de la Paris School of Economics) Seminar
Du 17/10/2017 de 17:00 à 18:00
TENAND Marianne ()
Horizontal equity in professional home care use. An assessment in the context of the French APA scheme
écrit avec Marianne Tenand
Paris Trade Seminar
Du 17/10/2017 de 14:45 à 16:15
ScPo, 28 rue des Saints Pères, 75007 Paris, salle H405
ANDERSON Chris (LSE)
*Short Run Gravity
écrit avec Y. Yotov
NGOs, Development and Globalization
Du 17/10/2017 de 14:30 à 17:00
Campus Jourdan - Salle R1-15
PLATTEAU Jean Philippe(University of Namur)
JACQUEMART Karine(Director - Foodwatch France)
*
14:30-15:20 - Karine Jacquemart (Director - Foodwatch France)
Insights from a citizen-based watchdog in the food sector
15:20-15:50 - Coffee Break
15:50-16:40 Jean Philippe Platteau (University of Namur)
Optimal management of transfers : an odd paradox (with François Bourguignon)
Applied Economics Lunch Seminar
Du 17/10/2017 de 12:30 à 13:30
Salle R1-09 Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
MEHMOOD Sultan (PSE & PARIS-DAUPHINE)
Judiciary’s Achilles Heel: Executive Control via Appointment Power
How does an increase of executive constraints impact the judiciary? We exploit a change in judicial selection procedure in a weak democracy, from the president selecting the judges to the selection of judges through a judicial commission, to ascertain the causal effects of an increase in executive constraints on judicial independence. By exploiting the across-district and over-time variation in reform exposure generated by random exit of judges, we are able to ascertain the causal effect of this reform on judicial outcomes. We find that this reform has a large effect on judicial independence. In particular, we show that the change in the selection procedure of judges caused a 20% reduction in state victories. This increase in independence does not come at the expense of increased case delay. Furthermore, the analysis of mechanisms reveal that the steepest fall in state victories occurred in less politically connected districts. We also provide suggestive evidence that the new appointment procedure also incentivised the incumbent judges to adjudicate against the state more often, though less so than the judges appointed under the new selection procedure.
Roy Seminar (ADRES)
Du 16/10/2017 de 17:00 à 18:30
Salle R1-09, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
PENTA Antonio (UW-Madison)
Rationalizability and Observability
GSIELM (Graduate Students International Economics and Labor Market) Lunch Seminar
Du 16/10/2017 de 13:00 à 14:00
Salle S/3, MSE, 106 boulevard de l'Hôpital, 75013 Paris
EL MALLAKH Nevine (Paris 1)
Disentangling channels of FDI spillover: Evidence from India
Governments spend large amounts of resources in order to attract multinational companies to their country, based on their belief that such companies generate positive spillovers to domestic firms. Although the existence of positive externalities correlated to FDI presence has been proved for the US, concerns on the significance of these effects for developing countries were raised. Also the literature has not provided empirical evidence on the validity of the channels leading to these effects. For these reasons, this paper exploits FDI reforms and Trade liberalization episodes in India in the early 1990’s to disentangle channels of FDI spillover on productivity of domestic firms; namely, the technical know-how and the foreign competition channels. Using firm level data on the period (1989-1997), we are able to identify the two main channels. Results confirm positive technological spillover through imported inputs as well as positive foreign competition. Findings also suggest that these channels are stronger for industries that are relatively more capital intensive and medium sized firms.
Régulation et Environnement
Du 16/10/2017 de 12:00 à 14:00
Salle R2-01, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
CHEN Stéphanie (University of Chicago)
Competitive Personalized Pricing with Sophisticated Consumers
écrit avec Chongwoo Choe, Monash University
Abstract
Personalized pricing, a limiting case of price discrimination as the number of targeted consumer segments increases, becomes increasingly common due to the availability of vast amount of individual-level data. This paper studies personalized pricing in a Hotelling setting when each firm has a given target segment and consumers can be sophisticated. Sophisticated consumers can overcome the hurdles for price discrimination and have access to the price offered to non-targeted consumers, which naive consumers cannot. When all consumers are naive, personalized pricing leads to intense competition and total industry profit lower than that under the Hotelling equilibrium. But market is always fully covered. Sophisticated consumers raise the firm's cost of serving non-targeted consumers, hence discourage firms from poaching the rival's targeted customers. This softens competition. When firms have sufficiently large and non-overlapping target segments, consumer sophistication allows firms to extract full surplus from their targeted customers through perfect price discrimination. Consumers are strictly worse-off under competitive personalized pricing, a result in contrast to the common view in the literature. With sophisticated consumers, firms also choose not to serve the entire market when the commonly non-targeted market segment is small. Thus consumer sophistication can lead to lower consumer surplus and lower social welfare. We also discuss the implications for the regulation of the use of customer data by firms.
Key words: Personalized pricing, consumer sophistication, customer targeting, privacy
JEL Classification: D43, D8, L13, L5
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Du 16/10/2017 de 11:00 à 12:00
Salle 01 (RDC), Centre Emile Borel, Institut Henri Poincaré, 11 rue Pierre et Marie Curie, 75005 Paris
SOLAN Eilan (Tel Aviv University )
Optimal Dynamic Inspection
We study a discounted repeated inspection game with two agents and one principal.
Both agents may pro.fit by violating certain rules, while the principal can inspect on
at most one agent in each period, in.flicting a punishment on an agent who is caught
violating the rules. The goal of the principal is to minimize the discounted number of
violations, and he has a Stackelberg leader advantage. We characterize the principal's
optimal inspection strategy.
Macroeconomics Seminar
Du 12/10/2017 de 15:45 à 17:00
PSE - 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris - salle R1-09
DEBORTOLI Davide (CREI)
Monetary Policy with Heterogeneous Agents: Insights from TANK models
écrit avec Jordi Gali
brown bag Travail et Économie Publique
Du 12/10/2017 de 12:30 à 13:30
TO Maxime (IPP)
Labour supply and taxation with restricted choices
A model of labour supply is developed in which observed hours reflect both the distribution of preferences and restrictions on the choice of hours. In the absence of information on the choice set facing each individual, observed hours may appear not to satisfy the revealed preference conditions for ‘rational’ choice. We focus on the case where the choice set contains at most two offers and show that when the choice set distribution is known, preferences can be identified. We then show that, where preferences are known, the choice set distribution can be fully recovered. Conditions for identification of both preferences and the distribution of choice sets are also developed. We illustrate this approach in a labour supply setting with nonlinear budget constraints. Non-linearities in the budget constraint are used to directly reveal restrictions on the choice set. This framework is used to study the labour supply behaviour of a large sample of working age mothers in the UK, accounting for nonlinearities in the tax and welfare benefit system, fixed costs of work and restrictions on hours choices.
Behavior seminar
Du 12/10/2017 de 11:00 à 12:00
PSE 48, bld Jourdan salle R2-21
EMERIC Henry(Science Po and CEPR)
JACQUEMET Nicolas.(Université Paris I and PSE)
GALBIATI Roberto(Sciences-Po)
Learning, Spillovers and Persistence: Institutions and the Dynamics of Cooperation
We study how cooperation-enforcing institutions dynamically affect values and behavior using a lab experiment designed to create individual specific histories of past institutional exposure. We show that the effect of past institutions is mostly due to “indirect” behavioral spillovers: facing penalties in the past increases partners’ cooperation in the past, which in turn positively affects ones’ own current behavior. We demonstrate that such indirect spillovers induce persistent effects of institutions. However, for interactions that occur early on, we find a negative effect of past enforcement due to differential learning under different enforcement institutions.
Behavior Working Group
Du 12/10/2017 de 10:00 à 11:00
R1-15
ETILÉ Fabrice(PSE)
YIN Rémi(PSE)
Personal Identity and Preferences: Empirical extensions
Economic History Seminar
Du 11/10/2017 de 12:30 à 14:00
Salle R2-20, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
BAILEY Marta (University of Michigan)
Prep School for Poor Kids: The Long-Term Effects of Head Start on Children
WIP (Work in progress) Working Group
Du 11/10/2017 de 11:00 à 12:30
Salle R1-15, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
PERDRIX Elsa(PSE)
GUILLOT Malka ()
FABRE Adrien(PSE)
The returns from private and political connections: New evidence from French Municipalities
PSI-PSE (Petit Séminaire Informel de la Paris School of Economics) Seminar
Du 10/10/2017 de 17:00 à 18:00
COLO Philippe (PSE)
Group beliefs in the face of uncertainty
Paris Migration Seminar
Du 10/10/2017 de 16:30 à 19:30
Salle R1-13, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
BARSBAI Toman(University of Bristol)
DE LA RUPELLE Maëlys(Université de Cergy-Pontoise)
The Economics of Family Reunification - Theory and Evidence from the Universe of Filipino Immigrants to the US
écrit avec Isabelle Chort
Paris Trade Seminar
Du 10/10/2017 de 14:45 à 16:15
ScPo, 28 rue des Saints Pères, 75007 Paris, salle H405
LARCH Mario (Bayreuth)
*Trade and Investment in the Global Economy
écrit avec James E. Anderson and Yoto V. Yotov
Applied Economics Lunch Seminar
Du 10/10/2017 de 12:30 à 13:30
Salle R2-01, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
ROTUNNO Lorenzo (AMSE)
Trade in unhealthy foods and obesity: Evidence from Mexico
écrit avec Osea Giuntella and Matthias Rieger
Roy Seminar (ADRES)
Du 09/10/2017 de 17:00 à 18:30
Salle R1-09, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
WOLITZKY Alexander (MIT)
Learning from Others' Outcomes
Abstract: I develop a simple model of social learning in which players observe others' outcomes but not their actions. There is a continuum of players, and each player chooses once-and-for-all between a safe action (which succeeds with known probability) and a risky action (which succeeds with fixed but unknown probability, depending on the state of the world). The actions also differ in their costs. Before choosing, a player observes the outcomes of K others. There is always an equilibrium in which success is more likely in the good state, and this regularity property holds whenever the initial generation of players is not well-informed about the state. In the case of an outcome-improving innovation (where the risky action may yield a higher probability of success), players take the correct action as K??. In the case of a cost-saving innovation (where the risky action involves saving a cost but accepting a lower probability of success), inefficiency persists as K?? in any regular equilibrium. Whether inefficiency takes the form of under-adoption or over-adoption also depends on the nature of the innovation. Convergence of the population to equilibrium may be non-monotone.
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Du 09/10/2017 de 11:00 à 12:00
Salle 01 (RDC), Centre Emile Borel, Institut Henri Poincaré, 11 rue Pierre et Marie Curie, 75005 Paris
MERTIKOPOULOS Panayotis ()
No-Regret Learning in Games
In many cases of practical interest, the players of a repeated game may not know the structure of the game being played - simply think of commuters driving to work every day, ignorant of the number of commuters at each part of the road. In such cases, it is often assumed that players follow a no-regret procedure, i.e. an updating policiy that provably minimizes each player's individual regret against any possible play of their opponents.
This talk focuses on the following question: does the sequence of play induced by a no-regret learning process converge to an equilibrium of the underlying stage game? I will present some recent contributions to this question (in both finite and continuous games), and I will discuss the impact of the feedback available to the players.
Casual Friday Development Seminar - Brown Bag Seminar
Du 06/10/2017 de 12:45 à 13:45
Salle R2-01, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
JATIVA Ximena ()
Unintended Consequences of Road Rehabilitation in Tanzania: Market Participation, Prices and Welfare
écrit avec Christelle Dumas (U. Fribourg)
Macroeconomics Seminar
Du 05/10/2017 de 15:45 à 17:00
PSE - 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris - Amphithéâtre
GIAVAZZI Francesco (Bocconi)
The macroeconomic effects of fiscal adjustment plans
TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar
Du 05/10/2017 de 13:00 à 14:00
salle R1-11, campus Jourdan - 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
ELLISON Sara (MIT)
Costs of Managerial Attention and Activity as a Source of Sticky Prices: Structural Estimates from an Online Market
Abstract: We study price dynamics for computer components sold on a price-comparison website.
Our fine-grained data—a year of hourly price data for scores of rival retailers—allow us to
estimate a dynamic model of competition, backing out structural estimates of managerial frictions.
The estimated frictions are substantial, concentrated in the act of monitoring market conditions
rather than entering a new price. We use our model to simulate the counterfactual gains from
automated price setting and other managerial changes. Coupled with supporting reduced-form
statistical evidence, our analysis provides a window into the process of managerial price setting
and the microfoundation of pricing inertia, issues of growing interest in industrial organization and
macroeconomics.
JEL Codes: L11, C73, D21, L81
brown bag Travail et Économie Publique
Du 05/10/2017 de 12:30 à 13:30
HE Yinghua (Rice U)
How to Identify Good Teachers? Teacher Evaluations and Student Achievement
The fact that teachers matter for student achievement is largely documented.Yet, identifying what makes good teaching has proven difficult, in spite of the large amount of attention this question has received in the last decade. In this paper, I shift the focus from the usual observable socio-demographic characteristics to the systematic and administrative evaluations of teachers by their hierarchy. I analyze the three grades used to assess teachers in secondary school in France: the certication grades, designed to assess teacher content-knowledge, the pedagogical grade, designed to assess pedagogical skills and the administrative grade, designed to assess administrative skills. I find that neither the certication grades (written nor oral) nor the administrative grade are signicantly associated with student achievement gains. The only evaluation grade statistically significantly associated with student achievement gains is the pedagogical grade: a standard deviation increase in this grade is associated with a two percent standard deviation increase in student achievement gains. This impact is on par with replacing an average teacher with a teacher at the 40th percentile of the teacher value-added distribution. Low income students are more sensitive to the pedagogical grade than others.These results has important implications for teacher training, hiring and assignment.
Behavior seminar
Du 05/10/2017 de 11:00 à 12:00
PSE, 48 bld Jourdan Paris 75014, salle R2-21
YANG David(PSE)
RIFQI Maria(LEMMA, Université Panthéon-Assas)
Automatic emotion recognition from physiological signals in a video game context
We present a multi-modal database for the analysis of human emotional states in the dynamic context of game. Peripheral physiological signals (ECG, EDA, respiration, EMG, temperature, pupil size), accelerometer signals, video were recorded for 58 participants who played 3 matches of a football simulation game (FIFA 2016) of different difficulty levels. After each match, participants were asked to annotate events which have triggered their emotions in terms of categorical emotions (boredom, frustration, anger, fear, happiness) and the arousal/valence score by reviewing the game recording. Global game experience in terms of the level of difficulty, implication and amusement evaluation and a ranking of the 3 matches were also collected from questionnaires. Combined with the global game experience evaluation, the database proposes a multi-scale view (local event scale and global match scale) for evaluating user emotions. Methods and results are presented from a local event view - classification of the emotional moment and no emotional moment, emotion recognition on the emotional moment, and from a global evaluation view - game experience evaluation. The database is made publicly available. The proposed database is the first available one which allows analysing the human emotional responses from physiological signals under dynamic interactive context of game.
Development Economics Seminar
Du 04/10/2017 de 16:30 à 18:00
DUFLO Esther (MIT)
USING GOSSIPS TO SPREAD INFORMATION: THEORY AND EVIDENCE FROM A RANDOMIZED CONTROLLED TRIAL
écrit avec with Abhijit Banerjee, Arun G. Chandrasekhar and Matthew O. Jackson
Abstract. Is it possible to identify individuals who are highly central in a community
without gathering any network information, simply by asking a few people?
If we use people’s nominees as seeds for a diffusion process, will it be successful?
We explore these questions theoretically, via surveys, and via field experiments. We
show via a model of information flow how members of a community can, just by
tracking gossip about others, identify highly central individuals in their network.
Asking villagers in rural Indian villages to name good seeds for diffusion, we find
that they accurately nominate those who are central according to a measure tailored
for diffusion – not just those with many friends or in powerful positions. Finally, we
run a randomized field experiment in 213 other villages that tests how effective it is
to use such nominations as seeds for a diffusion process. Relative to random seeds
or those with high social status, hitting at least one seed nominated by villagers
leads to more than a 65% increase in the spread of information.
JEL Classification Codes: D85, D13, L14, O12, Z13
Keywords: Centrality, Gossip, Networks, Diffusion, Influence, Social Learning
Economic History Seminar
Du 04/10/2017 de 12:30 à 14:00
Salle R2-20, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
CHRISTIN Olivier (CEDRE)
Les vrais actionnaires de l'entreprise sociale (Sieyes) : compagnies par actions et théorie de la représentation à l'époque moderne
PSI-PSE (Petit Séminaire Informel de la Paris School of Economics) Seminar
Du 03/10/2017 de 17:00 à 18:00
SEROR Marlon (University of Bristol)
Multi-candidate Political Competitions and the Industrial Organization of Politics
écrit avec Avner Seror, Thierry Verdier
Applied Economics Lunch Seminar
Du 03/10/2017 de 12:30 à 13:30
Salle R2-01, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
BANERJEE Abhijit (MIT)
How important are matching frictions in the labor market? Experimental & non-experimental evidence from India
écrit avec Gaurav Chiplunkar
This paper provides evidence of substantial matching frictions in the labor market in India. In particular, placement officers in vocational training institutes have very little information about the job preferences of candidates they are trying to place in jobs. In the first part of this study, we adopt a number of methods to elicit genuine preferences of candidates over different types of jobs. In the second part, we find that providing placement officers with these preference information leads to a substantial improvement in matching candidates to jobs interviews and hence subsequent employment outcomes for up to six months after initial placement.
Roy Seminar (ADRES)
Du 02/10/2017 de 17:00 à 18:30
salle R1-09, campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan - 75014 Paris
SANTIAGO OLIVEROS (University of Essex)
`Collective Hold-Up
écrit avec with Matias Iaryczower
GSIELM (Graduate Students International Economics and Labor Market) Lunch Seminar
Du 02/10/2017 de 13:00 à 14:00
Salle S/3, MSE, 106 boulevard de l'Hôpital, 75013 Paris
LAENGLE Katharina (Université Paris 1 - PSE)
Global value chains and labor market adjustments
The question how offshoring affects domestic workers has been subject to empirical studies for decades. Many analyses based their work on traditional trade data as a proxy for offshoring. However, these statistics fall short in depicting intertwinings of supply chains and how foreign production factors enter domestic production. For that reason, this paper quantifies offshoring in terms of value added thus allowing to trace back how much foreign capital and labor enter domestic production. Using data from the WIOD, effects are analyzed for 14 sectors in 16 countries between 1995 and 2008. Regarding low skilled workers, results confirm implications of the model by Grossman & Rossi-Hansberg (2008). Accordingly, offshoring proved to positively influence domestic low skilled workers’ wage shares, when their tasks were moved abroad. Yet, model assumptions and the empirical setup of this paper diverge thus question the mechanisms highlighted by GRH. Importantly, the growing share of foreign capital in production negatively affects low skilled workers' wage share while positively influencing that of high skilled. Consequently, findings suggest that offshoring benefits high skilled workers and harms low skilled.
Régulation et Environnement
Du 02/10/2017 de 12:00 à 14:00
Salle R2-01, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
FLECKINGER Pierre(Ecole des Mines - PSE)
FABRE Adrien(PSE)
The Incentive properties of collective reputation
écrit avec Wanda Mimra, ETH Zürich, and Angelo Zago, University of Verona