Calendrier du mois de décembre 2019
Casual Friday Development Seminar - Brown Bag Seminar
Du 20/12/2019 de 12:45 à 13:45
Salle R2.01, 48 Bd Jourdan 75014 Paris
LUKSIC Juan Diego (PSE)
Can immigration affect educational based neighborhood effects? Lesson from Chile
brown bag Travail et Économie Publique
Du 19/12/2019 de 12:30 à 13:30
LETROUIT Lucie (Université Gustave Eiffel)
From trust to registration: Alternative responses to urban land tenure insecurity in developing countries
écrit avec Co-author: H. Selod
We study, in an urban land use model, the inefficiencies associated with tenure insecurity and information asymmetry, and households' responses to mitigate tenure insecurity. When buyers and sellers of land plots can match along trusted kinship lines whereby deception (i.e., when sellers do not disclose competing claims on a plot to buyers) is socially penalized, information asymmetry is attenuated but overall participation in the market is reduced. When owners can make plots secure by paying to register them in a cadaster, information asymmetry is also reduced but the registration cost limits land-use conversion at the periphery of the city. We compare the overall surplus under these two models and under a hybrid version where both registration and trust relationships are available options. The analysis highlights the substitutability of trust relationships to costly registration and the gradual evolution of developieconomies towards full cadastral coverage if registration costs can be reduced.
TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar
Du 19/12/2019 de 12:30 à 13:30
salle R2-20, campus Jourdan - 75014 Paris
GLEYZE Simon (PSE)
Segregation and Expectation Formation on the Returns to Schooling
écrit avec Philippe Jehiel PSE/UCL
Histoire des entreprises et de la finance
Du 18/12/2019 de 17:00 à 19:00
Salle R1.10 Campus Jourdan, 48 bd Jourdan 75014 Paris
Development Economics Seminar
Du 18/12/2019 de 16:30 à 18:00
Salle R2.01 Campus Jourdan, 48 Bd Jourdan 75014 Paris
MIQUEL - FLORENSA Pepita (Toulouse School of Economics)
Buyer-Driven Upgrading in GVCs: The Sustainable Quality Program in Colombia
écrit avec R. Macchiavello
Abstract: This paper studies the Sustainable Quality Program in Colombia – a quality upgrading program implemented on behalf of a multinational coffee buyer. The Program is a bundle of contractual arrangements involving farmers, intermediaries, exporters and the multinational buyer. We tackle three questions. First, we inves- tigate the impact of the Program on the supply of quality coffee. Eligible farmers upgraded their plantations, expanded land under coffee cultivation, increased quality and received higher farm gate prices. Second, we quantify how the Program gains are shared between farmers and intermediaries along the chain. In regions in which the Program was rolled out surplus along the chain increased by ? 30%. Eligible farmers kept at least half of the gains and their welfare increased by ? 20%. Finally, we examine how the Program works conducting counterfactual exercises and comparing the Program price premia along the chain against two prominent non-buyer driven certifications. The Program achieved a better transmission of the export gate price premium for quality to the farm gate and curbed market failures that stifled quality upgrading. Contractual arrangements at the export gate significantly contributed to higher farmers welfare in rural areas.
Economic History Seminar
Du 18/12/2019 de 12:30 à 14:00
Salle R1.09, Campus Jourdan 48 Bd Jourdan 75014 Paris
FOURIE Johan (Stellenbosch University)
Expropriation with partial compensation: slave emancipation and the longevity of slaveholders
PSI-PSE (Petit Séminaire Informel de la Paris School of Economics) Seminar
Du 17/12/2019 de 17:00 à 18:00
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KNEBELMANN Justine ()
Property Tax under Weak Enforcement
I combine administrative and survey data to characterize the current functioning of the property tax in the urban region of Dakar (Senegal). This paper aims to assess the Property Tax Gap; to identify determinants of being in the tax net; and finally to discuss whether a weakly functioning property tax ends up being more or less progressive than the (theoretically not progressive) tax defined by the legal framework. This is work in progress using baseline data for an RCT that is in the field.
Paris Trade Seminar
Du 17/12/2019 de 14:45 à 16:15
Sciences Po, 28 rue des Saints-Pères, 75007 Paris (M° Saint Germain des Prés), SALLE H 402
BEKKERS Eddy (WTO)
The welfare effects of trade policy experiments in quantitative trade models: the role of solution methods and baseline calibration
Texte intégral
Applied Economics Lunch Seminar
Du 17/12/2019 de 12:30 à 13:30
Salle R2-01, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
GLEYZE Simon (PSE)
Segregation and Expectation Formation on the Returns to Schooling
écrit avec Philippe Jehiel (PSE/UCL)
We show that low credit constraints together with high returns to schooling are consistent with low investment in human capital if students form their expectation on the returns to schooling by word-of-mouth learning. Under rational expectations, computing these expected returns requires to know the joint distribution of schooling, ability and wages. Instead, in our model students estimate this joint distribution by sampling their social network with a selection bias toward students with similar ability. The perceived returns to schooling exhibit regression to the mean compared to the opportunity cost, leading to self-selection and equilibrium mismatch. We discuss policy implications and show that quotas might be ineffective. We then derive a new form of bias in the estimated returns to schooling from Mincer equations. It is caused by the equilibrium misallocation of students to schools leading to a downward "mismatch bias" on the estimated returns. Finally, we discuss econometric issues in demand estimation from matching data and show that most identifying assumptions (Nash equilibrium, stability, undominated strategies, etc.) induce biased estimates of structural parameters.
Roy Seminar (ADRES)
Du 16/12/2019 de 17:00 à 18:30
salle R1-09, campus Jourdan - 75014 Paris
STRACK Philipp (Yale University)
The Cost of Information
écrit avec Luciano Pomatto, Omer Tamuz
We develop an axiomatic theory of information acquisition that captures the ideaof constant marginal costs in information production: the cost of generating twoindependent signals is the sum of their costs, and generating a signal with probabilityhalf costs half its original cost. Together with a monotonicity and a continuityconditions, these axioms determine the cost of a signal up to a vector of parameters.These parameters have a clear economic interpretation and determine the difficultyof distinguishing states. We argue that this cost function is a versatile modeling toolthat leads to more realistic predictions than mutual information.
Régulation et Environnement
Du 16/12/2019 de 12:00 à 13:00
salle R1-14, campus Jourdan - 75014 Paris
LUENGO Andres (Pontificia Universidad Javeriana)
Environmental Misallocation in the Copper Industry
We use mine-level data from the international copper industry to quantify environmental
misallocation. We define this concept as the ratio between the observed carbon
dioxide (CO2) emissions in the industry and the level reached by a social planner that
allocate the observed output across mines so as to minimize emissions, conditional on
the current state of the technology and some well-defined extraction rules. We find that
CO2 emissions derived from the world copper industry could be reduced by 47% under
the planner's allocation. We also find that the latter allocation of output would bring
down production costs by 24% at the aggregate level. Our results suggest that a cleaner
environment is not necessarily tied to lower levels of productive efficiency.
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Du 16/12/2019 de 11:00 à 12:00
Institut Henri Poincaré, 11 rue Pierre et Marie Curie, Paris 5ème
PAWLOWITSCH Christina (Université Panthéon-Assas, LEMMA)
Evolutionary dynamics of costly signaling
écrit avec Josef Hofbauer
Costly-signaling games have a remarkably wide range of applications (education as a costly signal in the job market, handicaps as a signal for fitness in mate selection, politeness in language). The formal analysis of evolutionary dynamics in costly-signaling games has only recently gained more attention. In this paper, we study evolutionary dynamics in two basic classes of games with two states of nature, two signals, and two possible reactions in response to signals: a discrete version of Spence’s (1973) model and a discrete version of Grafen’s (1990) formalization of the handicap principle. We first use index theory to give a rough account of the dynamic stability properties of the equilibria in these games. Then, we study in more detail the replicator dynamics and to some extent the best-response dynamics.
Casual Friday Development Seminar - Brown Bag Seminar
Du 13/12/2019 de 12:45 à 13:45
Salle R2.01, 48 Bd Jourdan 75014 Paris
WRIGHT Kelsey (PSE)
Social Safety Nets and Intrahousehold Resource Allocation in Niger
EPCI (Economie politique du changement institutionnel) Seminar
Du 13/12/2019 de 11:00 à 12:30
MSE, Salle 18 (Nouveau Bât) 106-112 Bd de l'Hôpital 75013 Paris
TADJEDDINE Yamina (U. Lorraine) La diversité des capitalismes financiers, le cas des Fusions-Acquisition en France;
La séance est annulée
Macroeconomics Seminar
Du 12/12/2019 de 15:45 à 17:00
PSE - 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris, salle R2-21
GEEROLF François (UCLA)
The Macroeconomic Effects of Lump-Sum Taxes
écrit avec Thomas Grjebine, CEPII
This paper measures tax multipliers using the property tax, which is the closest real-world counterpart to a lump-sum tax. This allows us to test for Ricardian equivalence and to isolate the demand-side component of tax multipliers. For identification, we use more than 100 exogenous property tax changes in advanced economies isolated through the narrative record, as well as structural VAR approaches that include more than 1,000 tax changes. We find, using both types of methods—independently—that tax multipliers are between 2 and 3, in line with a growing consensus in the literature. This contradicts Ricardian equivalence, and questions models that predict large tax multipliers only for distortionary tax changes. The effects are persistent, which implies that aggregate demand shocks can have long-term effects.
PSE Internal Seminar
Du 12/12/2019 de 12:30 à 14:00
salle R2-01, campus Jourdan - 75014 Paris
LAMBERT-MOGILIANSKY Ariane(PSE)
BEZIN Emeline()
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Paris Migration Seminar
Du 12/12/2019
OECD Conference Centre – 2, rue Andre-Pascal 75775 Paris CEDEX 16
Histoire des entreprises et de la finance
Du 11/12/2019 de 17:00 à 19:00
Salle R1.10 Campus Jourdan, 48 bd Jourdan 75014 Paris
FOURIE Johan (Stellenbosch University)
Firm survival during war: evidence from limited liability records and the Anglo-Boer War
Economic History Seminar
Du 11/12/2019 de 12:30 à 14:00
Salle R1.09, Campus Jourdan, 48 Bd Jourdan 75014 Paris
HUMPHRIES Jane (University of Oxford) In search of the real cost of living: Primary sources and respectable living standards;
La séance est annulée
PSI-PSE (Petit Séminaire Informel de la Paris School of Economics) Seminar
Du 10/12/2019 de 17:00 à 18:00
BARRERA Oscar ()
Migration and perception
Applied Economics Lunch Seminar
Du 10/12/2019 de 12:30 à 13:30
Salle R2-01, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
ASSOUAD Lydia (PSE)
Charismatic Leaders and Nation building: Ataturk's visits in Turkey
Can leaders successfully shape beliefs and social norms? I address this question by studying the role of Mustafa Kemal, the founder of modern Turkey, in spreading a new national identity. Using a generalized difference-in-differences design, that exploits time and geographic variation in Kemal’s visits to cities, I test whether direct exposure to a charismatic leader affects citizens' take-up of the new national identity. I show that cities visited are more likely to embrace the common identity, as proxied by the adoption of first names in "Pure Turkish", the new language introduced by the state. I investigate the mechanisms and find that Kemal was more efficient in spreading a new identity compared to Ismet Inonu his "second man", suggesting that he did not only have a pure informational effect. This is consistent with the Weberian view that "charismatic authority" can play a role in legitimizing new social orders.
Roy Seminar (ADRES)
Du 09/12/2019 de 17:00 à 18:30
salle R2-21, campus Jourdan - 75014 Paris
WOLTON Stephane (LSE)
A Political Economy of Social Discrimination
écrit avec Torun Dewan
From burqa ban to minaret ban, from right to detain suspected illegal immigrants to restricting the help to migrants, the number of social laws specifically targeting a tiny proportion of citizens has raised in recent years across Western democracies. These symbolic policies, we show, are far from being innocuous: they can have far reaching consequences for large parts of the population. By raising the salience of certain social traits (e.g., Muslim identity) these laws can create a labour market loaded in favor of the majority (e.g., the non-Muslims), yielding higher unemployment rates and spells for minority citizens. These deleterious effects arise even absent any form of bias against, or uncertainty about, minority workers. Instead they are fully driven by social expectations about behavior and are best understood as a form of social discrimination. Importantly, we establish conditions under which a plurality of the citizenry demands the implementation of symbolic policies anticipating their labor market consequences. We further highlight that the implementation of symbolic policies is always associated with less redistribution and can be coupled with lower tax rates. We discuss several policy recommendations to limit the possibility of social discrimination arising.
GSIELM (Graduate Students International Economics and Labor Market) Lunch Seminar
Du 09/12/2019 de 13:00 à 14:00
IODICE Irène (Scuola Superiore Sant’Anna - Paris 1 - EMbeDS)
The Sound of Silence. Nontransparent technical requirements as obstacles to trade
Exporters mostly encounter trade obstacles due to unclear procedures to comply with foreign regulations,
while the implementation itself is less of a burden. In this work we investigate the protective
nature of newly introduced regulations that are not properly disclosed at the international level. We
begin by building a novel database which identifies the process of adoption of those Technical Barriers
to Trade (TBTs) that have been contested to the WTO through a Specific Trade Concern (STC).
We then cross-reference this database with a firm-level panel of French exporters and we carry out an
event study. We find that in more than 1/3 of the studied cases countries have adopted the underlying
regulations without previously announcing the change to other members. Only in these cases, the
newly introduced regulation hampers the exporting activity of firms by reducing firms’ trade value.
This effect is however temporary, ranging from one to two semesters, and it lasts less if
the content of the TBT is eventually disclosed by governments. Finally, only those exporters who are
relatively new to the destination market are hit by these unexpected changes. This evidence suggests
that, by rising procedural obstacles, countries can effectively deploy regulations that hinders imports.
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Du 09/12/2019 de 11:00 à 12:00
Institut Henri Poincaré, 11 rue Pierre et Marie Curie, Paris 5ème
CORREA José (Universidad de Chile)
On the Price of Anarchy for flows over time
écrit avec Andres Cristi and Tim Oosterwijk
Dynamic network flows, or network flows over time, constitute an important model for real-world situations where steady states are unusual, such as urban traffic and the Internet. These applications immediately raise the issue of analyzing dynamic network flows from a game-theoretic perspective. In this paper we study dynamic equilibria in the deterministic fluid queuing model in single-source single-sink networks, arguably the most basic model for flows over time. In the last decade we have witnessed significant developments in the theoretical understanding of the model. However, several fundamental questions remain open. One of the most prominent ones concerns the Price of Anarchy, measured as the worst case ratio between the minimum
time required to route a given amount of flow from the source to the sink, and the time a dynamic equilibrium takes to perform the same task. Our main result states that if we could reduce the inflow of the network in a dynamic equilibrium, then the Price of Anarchy is exactly e/(e ? 1) ? 1.582. This significantly extends a result by Bhaskar, Fleischer, and Anshelevich (SODA 2011). Furthermore, our methods allow to determine that the Price of Anarchy in parallel-link networks is exactly 4/3. Finally, we argue that if a certain very natural monotonicity conjecture holds, the Price of Anarchy in the general case is exactly e/(e ? 1).
Casual Friday Development Seminar - Brown Bag Seminar
Du 06/12/2019 de 12:45 à 13:45
Salle R2.21, 48 Bd Jourdan 75014 Paris
LAAJAJ Rachid (PSE)
The Costs of Bureaucracy and Corruption at Customs: Evidence from the Computerization of Imports in Colombia
TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar
Du 05/12/2019 de 12:30 à 13:30
salle R2-20, campus Jourdan - 75014 Paris
POMMEY Guillaume (PSE)
Partnership Dissolution with Cash-Constrained Agents
When partnerships come to an end, partners must find a way to efficiently reallocate the commonly owned assets to those who value them the most. This requires that the aforementioned members possess enough financial resources to buy out others' shares. I investigate ex post efficient partnership dissolution when agents are ex post cash constrained. I derive necessary and sufficient conditions for ex post efficient partnership dissolution with Bayesian (resp. dominant strategy) incentive compatible, interim individually rational, ex post (resp. ex ante) budget balanced and ex post cash-constrained mechanisms. Ex post efficient dissolution is more likely to be feasible when agents with low (resp. large) cash resources own more (resp. less) initial ownership rights. Furthermore, I propose a simple auction to implement the optimal mechanism. Finally, I investigate second-best mechanisms when cash constraints are such that ex post efficient dissolution is not attainable.
Travail et économie publique externe
Du 05/12/2019 de 12:30 à 13:45
PSE- 48 boulevard Jourdan, 74014 Paris, salle R1-14
GUGGENBERGER Patrik (Penn State University)
A more powerful subvector Anderson Rubin test in linear instrumental variables regression with conditional heteroskedasticity
écrit avec Co-authors: Frank Kleibergen and Sophocles Mavroeidis
We study subvector inference in the linear instrumental variables model allowing for arbitrary forms of conditional heteroskedasticity and weak instruments. The subvector Anderson and Rubin (1949) test that uses chi square critical values with degrees of freedom reduced by the number of parameters not under test, proposed by Guggenberger, Kleibergen, Mavroeidis, and Chen (2012), has correct asymptotic size under conditional homoskedasticity but is generally conservative. Guggenberger, Kleibergen, Mavroeidis (2019) propose a conditional subvector Anderson and Rubin test that uses data dependent critical values that adapt to the strength
of identi?cation of the parameters not under test. This test also has correct asymptotic size under conditional homoskedasticity and strictly higher power than the subvector Anderson and Rubin test by Guggenberger et al. (2012). Here we first generalize the test in Guggenberger at al (2019) to a setting that allows for a general Kronecker product structure which covers conditional homoskedasticity and some forms of conditional heteroskedasticity. To allow for arbitrary forms of conditional heteroskedasticity, we propose a two step testing procedure. The first step, akin to a technique suggested in Andrews and Soares (2010) in a different context, selects a model, namely general Kronecker product structure or arbitrary forms of conditional heteroskedasticty. If the former is selected, then in the second step the generalized version of Guggenberger et al. (2019) is used, otherwise a particular version of a heteroskedasticity robust test suggested in Andrews (2017). We show that the new two step test has correct asymptotic size and is more powerful and quicker to run than several alternative
procedures suggested in the recent literature.
Development Economics Seminar
Du 04/12/2019 de 16:30 à 18:00
Salle R2.01 Campus Jourdan,48 Bd Jourdan 75014 Paris
CAI Jing (University of Maryland)
Direct and Indirect Effects of Financial Access on SMEs.
We measure the direct and indirect effects of access to finance using a randomized experiment with 3,100 firms in 78 local markets in China, which created variation in firms’ access to a new loan product both within and across markets. Our estimates imply that: (1) Financial access has large positive direct effects. Providing access to a firm increases its revenue by 9 percent, and also significantly increases profits, employment, the number of clients and the use of trade credit. The new loan does not crowd out existing loans. (2) Financial access has large negative indirect effects. Providing access to all of a firm’s competitors in the local market reduces its revenue by 7 percent, and also significantly reduces profits, employment, the number of clients and the use of trade credit. (3) In a model matched to the data in which the indirect effect reflects business stealing, treating all firms in a market would generate—despite nearly offsetting direct and indirect effects on firms—sizeable welfare gains to consumers who benefit from competition.
Economic History Seminar
Du 04/12/2019 de 12:30 à 14:00
Salle R1.09, Campus Jourdan 48 bd Jourdan 75014 Paris
COGNEAU Denis(PSE)
LEMERCIER Claire(CNRS)
STANZIANI Alessandro(EHESS)
GRENIER Jean-Yves(EHESS)
HAUTCOEUR Pierre-Cyrille(EHESS & PSE)
VEG Sebastian(EHESS)
Autour du livre de Thomas Piketty, Capital et idéologie
Paris Trade Seminar
Du 03/12/2019 de 14:45 à 16:15
Sciences Po, 28 rue des Saints-Pères, 75007 Paris (M° Saint Germain des Prés), SALLE H 402
MRAZOVA Monika (U. Geneva)
IO for Export(s)
écrit avec J. Peter Neary
Applied Economics Lunch Seminar
Du 03/12/2019 de 12:30 à 13:30
Salle R2-01, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
GUILLAUD Elvire (Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne)
The Law of Rank
écrit avec Michaël Zemmour (U Paris 1 Pantheon Sorbonne, CES & Sciences Po, LIEPP)
In comparing tax systems across developed countries, scholars generally stress differences. However, we point to a relationship common to all countries when we consider the link between tax rates and income percentile rather than the link between tax rates and income level. Across all countries, this relationship is (1) remarkably linear, (2) with a uniform slope of 3%. The additional tax that one has to pay when climbing in the income ladder is therefore the same everywhere. We call this common shape of taxation the ’Law of rank’. We establish this stylized fact for 22 OECD countries over 17 years, using LIS dataset supplemented with OECD tax data. Combined with the different pretax income distributions and the various average tax rates across developed economies, this ’Law of rank’ has important theoretical implications, as it allows us to predict the well-known properties of existing tax schedules: (i) Local progressivity in taxation is higher when income inequality is low (i.e. when the gap in income from one fractile to the next is small); (ii) Marginal tax rates are increasing in income, before to decrease for top incomes in every country – yet at different paces; (iii) Global pro- gressivity in taxation (Kakwani disproportionality measure) decreases with the country average tax rate.
Roy Seminar (ADRES)
Du 02/12/2019 de 17:00 à 18:30
salle R2-21, campus Jourdan - 75014 Paris
PYCIA Marek (University Zurich)
Evaluating with Statistics: Which Outcome Measures Differentiate Among Matching Mechanisms?
The selection of mechanisms to allocate school seats in public school districts can be highly contentious. At the same time the standard statistics of student outcomes calculated from districts’ data are very similar for many mechanisms. This paper contributes to the debate on mechanism selection by explaining the similarity puzzle as being driven by the invariance properties of the standard outcome statistics: outcome measures are approximately similar if and only if they are approximately anonymous.
Régulation et Environnement
Du 02/12/2019 de 12:00 à 13:00
salle R1-13, campus Jourdan - 75014 Paris
SABATINO Lorien (Politecnico di Torino)
Fast Internet and Firm Creation: Evidence from Italy
In this paper we provide new empirical evidence on the impact of ultra-fast broadband deployment on local growth, and in particular on local new business establishment. We leverage on a unique dataset collecting data on broadband coverage and firm creation for every Italian municipality over the period 2013-2018. Our identification strategy relies on the distance between municipalities and the closest telephone exchange with optical line terminal (OLT). Preliminary results show that OLS estimates are upward biased, as they overestimate the impact of ultra-fast broadband deployment on firm establishment.
Results depend crucially on the industrial sector we
consider: technology-intensive sectors such as ICT and scientific activities are strongly positively affected by the introduction of new broadband infrastructure, while more traditional sectors such as agriculture and manufacturing are not significantly affected by high-speed connections. Taken together, our results highlight the heterogeneous effects of new broadband technologies on local business establishment.
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Du 02/12/2019 de 11:00 à 12:00
Institut Henri Poincaré, 11 rue Pierre et Marie Curie, Paris 5ème
GALICHON Alfred (New York University)
The equilibrium flow problem and multivocal gross substitutes
écrit avec Larry Samuelson and Lucas Vernet
We show that several classical economic models such as two-sided matching models, min-cost flow problems, hedonic models, and dynamic programming problems are subcases of a more general class of problems called equilibrium flow problems. To analyze this problem, we introduce a novel notion of gross substitutes for correspondences called "multivocal gross substitutes". We show that this notion generalizes some familiar notions of substitutes (such as weak gross substitutes) while strengthening others (such as that of Kelso and Crawford). Our main result, the inverse isotonicity theorem, establishes that if an excess supply correspondence satisfies multivocal gross substitutes, then the inverse correspondence is isotone in the strong set order, extending to the corresponding case results by Berry, Gandhi and Haile (2013). As another consequence, extend the lattice structure results of Demange and Gale (1985) to general networks beyond the bipartite case.