Calendrier du mois de mars 2016
TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar
Du 31/03/2016 de 12:45 à 13:45
Campus jourdan, Bâtiment G, Rez de chaussée, Salle F (réunion)
LAMBERT-MOGILIANSKY Ariane (PSE) Dynamic consistency of expected utility under non-classical(quantum) uncertainty; écrit avec Danilov V.I. and V. Vergopoulos
La séance est annulée
PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group
Du 31/03/2016 de 12:30 à 14:00
Campus jourdan, Bâtiment G, Rez de chaussée, Salle F (réunion)
PRAT Andrea (COLUMBIA)
*
Development Economics Seminar
Du 30/03/2016 de 17:00 à 18:30
Campus jourdan, Bâtiment G, Rez de chaussée, Salle F (réunion)
RAVALLION Martin (Georgetown University)
Social Frictions to Knowledge Diffusion : Evidence from an Information Intervention
Does knowledge about antipoverty programs spread quickly with in poor communities or are there significant frictions, such as due to social exclusion? We combine longitudinal and intra-household observations in estimating the direct knowledge gain from watching an information movie in rural India, while randomized village assignment identifies knowledge sharing with those in treatment villageswho did not watch the movie. Knowledge is found to be shared withinvillages, but lesssoamong illiterate and lower caste individuals, especially when also poor; these groups relied more on actually seeing the movie. Sizeable biases are evident in impact estimators that ignore knowledge spillovers
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Paris Trade Seminar
Du 29/03/2016 de 14:30 à 16:00
Maison des Sciences économiques, salle du 6ème étage (106-112 boulevard de l'hôpital, 75013 Paris)
COUTTENIER Mathieu (ENS Lyon)
*This mine is mine! How minerals fuel conflicts in Africa
écrit avec N. Berman, D. Rohner and M. Thoenig
Applied Economics Lunch Seminar
Du 29/03/2016 de 12:30 à 13:30
Campus jourdan, Bâtiment G, Rez de chaussée, Salle F (réunion)
MARKEVICH Andrei (New Economic School; Hoover Institution Stanford University)
The Economic Effects of the Abolition of Serfdom: Evidence from the Russian Empire
écrit avec Ekaterina Zhuravskaya (PSE)
We document a very large increase in agricultural productivity, peasants’ living standards, and industrial development in late 19th century Imperial Russia as a result of the abolition of serfdom in 1861. A counterfactual exercise shows that if serfs were freed in 1820, by 1913 Russia would have been more than one-and-a-half times richer, compared to what it actually was. We construct a novel province-level panel dataset of development outcomes, and conduct a difference-in differences analysis of the effects of the abolition of serfdom, relying on cross-sectional variation in the shares of serfs and the timing of the different stages of reform, controlling for unobserved variation across provinces and over time, as well as province-specific development trends. We disentangle the two stages of the abolition of serfdom: the emancipation of serfs and the subsequent land reform. We show that, in contrast to the large positive effect of emancipation, land reform negatively affected agricultural productivity. We provide evidence that a shift to more marketable crops from traditional non-marketable crops is the main mechanism behind the positive effect of emancipation, and the increase in the power of re-partition peasant communes is the main mechanism behind the negative effect of land reform.
TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar
Du 24/03/2016 de 12:45 à 13:45
Campus jourdan, Bâtiment G, Rez de chaussée, Salle F (réunion)
BLOCH Francis ( Université Paris 1 Panthéon Sorbonne)
The formation of partnerships in social networks
écrit avec Bhaskar Dutta, Stephane Robin et Min Zhu
This paper analyzes the formation of partnerships in social networks. Agents randomly request favors and turn to their neighbors to form a partnership where they commit to provide the favor when requested. If favors are costly, agents have an incentive to delay the formation of the partnership. In that case, we show that for any initial social network, the unique Markov Perfect equilibrium results in the formation of the maximum number of partnerships when players become infinitely patient. If favors provide benefits, agents rush to form partnerships at the cost of disconnecting other agents and the only perfect initial networks for which the maximum number of partnerships are formed are the complete and complete bipartite networks. The theoretical model is tested in the lab. Experimental results show that a large fraction of the subjects (75%) play according to their subgame perfect equilibrium strategy and reveals that the efficient maximum matching is formed over 78% of the times. When subjects deviate from their best responses, they accept to form partnerships too early. The incentive to accept when it is optimal to reject is positively correlated with subjects' risk aversion, and players employ simple heuristics -- like the presence of a captive partner -- to decide whether they should accept or reject the formation of a partnership.
Economic History Seminar
Du 23/03/2016 de 12:30 à 14:00
Campus jourdan, Bâtiment G, Rez de chaussée, Salle F (réunion)
GARCIA-PENALOSA Cecilia (CNRS, Aix Marseille School of Economics, EHESS) )
Protectionism and the Education Fertility Tradeoff in Late 19th century France
écrit avec Vincent Bignon
Applied Economics Lunch Seminar
Du 22/03/2016 de 12:30 à 13:30
Campus jourdan, Bâtiment G, Rez de chaussée, Salle F (réunion)
BACH Maria (Lausanne)
Rich Pickings? Risk, Return, and Skill in the Portfolios of the Wealthy
écrit avec Laurent Calvet et Paolo Sodini
Roy Seminar (ADRES)
Du 21/03/2016 de 17:00 à 18:30
Campus jourdan, Bâtiment G, Rez de chaussée, Salle F (réunion)
CHASSANG Sylvain (Princeton)
Collusion in Auctions with Constrained Bids: Theory and Evidence from Public Procurement
Industrial Organization
Du 21/03/2016 de 12:00 à 13:15
Campus jourdan, Bâtiment G, Rez de chaussée, Salle F (réunion)
DUBOIS Vincent (TSE)
On the Role of Parallel Trade on Manufacturers and Retailers Profits in the Pharmaceutical Sector
écrit avec Morten Saethre
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Du 21/03/2016 de 11:00 à 12:00
salle 01 (rez-de-chaussée) au Centre Emile Borel de l'Institut Henri Poincaré, 11 rue Pierre et Marie Curie, Paris 5ème
QUINCAMPOIX Marc ()
Casual Friday Development Seminar - Brown Bag Seminar
Du 18/03/2016 de 12:45 à 13:45
Campus jourdan, Bâtiment G, Rez de chaussée, Salle F (réunion)
VINEZ Margaux (PSE)
History and access to land on the frontier
RISK Working Group
Du 17/03/2016 de 17:00 à 18:15
Campus jourdan, Bâtiment G, Rez de chaussée, Salle F (réunion)
CRAINICH David (IESEG)
Saving and the demand for protection against risk
écrit avec Co-author : Richard Peter
TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar
Du 17/03/2016 de 12:30 à 14:30
Campus jourdan, Bâtiment G, Rez de chaussée, Salle F (réunion)
BONNET Celine(Toulouse School of Economics, INRAE)
GEEROLF François(UCLA)
Information Design: The Random Posterior Approach (1)
(1)Information affects behavior by affecting beliefs. Information design studies how to disclose information to a group of players to incentivize them to behave in a desired way. This paper is a theoretical investigation of information design, culminating with a representation theorem and a fundamental application of it. We adopt a random posterior perspective, viewing information design as belief manipulation rather than information disclosure. The representation theorem shows that it is as if the designer manipulated beliefs in a specific way, shaping the approach in games, as did Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) in one-agent problems. The representation theorem can also be implemented in specific problems, for example in the beauty contest and multiple-agent problems. We focus on an application that we dub the Mother's Problem.
(joint with J. Perego and I. Taneva)
(2)This paper shows that Pareto distributions can arise from production functions rather than from the distribution of primitives. A version of Garicano (2000)’s knowledge-based production hierarchies microfounds such a production function. It generates under very limited assumptions on the distribution of primitives (here, agents’ skills), Pareto distributions for span of control of CEOs as well as intermediary managers, and in particular Zipf’s law for firm sizes when the number of layers of management becomes large. This breakdown of the aggregate firm size distribution receives important empirical support in the French matched employer-employee administrative data. This novel justification of Pareto distributions can shed a new light on why outcomes are often so out of proportion compared to underlying primitives. For example, it provides a framework to study the recent rise in top income inequality. The analysis also has striking implications on the literature on firm heterogeneity: Pareto distributions are in fact the benchmark distributions arising in the case of perfect homogeneity, while heterogeneity in primitives should instead be backed out in the deviations from Pareto distributions.
Football et sciences sociales : les footballeurs entre institutions et marchés
Du 16/03/2016 de 18:00 à 19:30
Campus jourdan,Bâtiment A, Rez de chaussée, Salle 4
WITTERSHEIM Eric (Directeur de l’IRIS)
La fin des supporters? Retour sur une enquête dans les tribunes populaires du PSG
Travail et économie publique externe
Du 16/03/2016 de 12:30 à 13:45
Campus jourdan,Bâtiment A, Rez de chaussée, Salle 4
OREOPOULOS Phillip (Canadian Institute For Advanced Research - Univerity of Toronto)
Texting Students to Help Achieve Their Goals
Many social scientists and policy makers express concern over low levels of college completion and poor overall academic performance. One explanation, drawing on recent insights from behavioral science, suggests that youth often overemphasize the present or rely too much on routine. Another, drawing on social-psychology, suggests incoming students with weak academic identities (perhaps due to being a first generational or international student) struggle in transitioning to their new environment. This study explores ways to counter these tendencies using online exercises and electronic messaging. Randomly selected students at a 4-year college are randomized into three treatment groups and a control. The first group is given an online goal-setting exercise to think about their future and what steps to take now to help them achieve their goals. The second group is offered additional electronic messages containing advice, information, motivation, and reminders, with the aim of improving performance, experience, and completion. The third group's online exercise involves reading through past 'testimonials' how previous students struggled with their college transition yet persevered and were successful.
Paris Trade Seminar
Du 15/03/2016 de 14:30 à 16:00
Maison des Sciences économiques, salle du 6ème étage (106-112 boulevard de l'hôpital, 75013 Paris)
FUGAZZA M. (UNCTAD)
*The Bilateral Impact of Non-Tariff Measures: insights from firm level evidence
Applied Economics Lunch Seminar
Du 15/03/2016 de 12:30 à 13:30
SEGÚ ARTÉS Mariona (Laboratoire RITM Université Paris-Sud, Paris Saclay)
Taxing Vacant Apartments: Can fiscal policy reduce vacancy?
Roy Seminar (ADRES)
Du 14/03/2016 de 17:00 à 18:30
Campus jourdan,Bâtiment A, Rez de chaussée, Salle 4
ALONSO Ricardo (London School of Economics)
Recruitment and Selection in Organizations
This paper studies employer recruitment and selection of job applicants when productivity is match-specific. Job seekers have private, noisy estimates of match value, while the firm performs noisy interviews. Job seekers' willingness to incur the application costs varies with the perceived hiring probability, while the firm considers the applicant pool's composition when setting hiring standards. I show that changes in the accuracy of job seekers' estimates, or the firm's interview, affect application decisions, and both can raise hiring costs when they discourage applications. Thus, the firm may favor noisier interviews or prefer to face applicants that are less informed of their person-organization fit.
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Du 14/03/2016 de 11:00 à 12:00
salle 01 (rez-de-chaussée) au Centre Emile Borel de l'Institut Henri Poincaré, 11 rue Pierre et Marie Curie, Paris 5ème
ZILIOTO Bruno ()
EPCI (Economie politique du changement institutionnel) Seminar
Du 11/03/2016 de 11:00 à 12:30
MSE (106-112, boulevard de l'Hôpital – Room B2.1) Paris 13
ORLEAN Andre (CNRS-EHESS)
La valeur économique comme fait social : la preuve par les évaluations boursières
TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar
Du 10/03/2016 de 12:45 à 13:45
Campus jourdan,Bâtiment A, Rez de chaussée, Salle 4
VENEL Xavier (Paris 1 et PSE)
Dynamical strategic interaction in social networks
We consider a dynamical model of influence with a set of non-strategic agents and two strategic agents. The non-strategic agents are organized in a fixed network describing how they influence each other. The strategic agents have opposite opinion and try to drive the opinion of the society by targeting key-players in the network. We formulate this problem as a two-player zero-sum stochastic games allowing the strategic agents to change their target at every stage of the game. We prove the existence of the uniform value: if the player are sufficiently patient, both players can guarantee the same mean-average opinion without knowing the exact discount factor.
Development Economics Seminar
Du 09/03/2016 de 17:00 à 18:30
Campus jourdan,Bâtiment A, Rez de chaussée, Salle 4
FOSTER Andrew (Brown University)
Direct and Indirect Effects of Voluntary Certification: Evidence from the Mexican Clean Industry Program Draft (February 2016)
écrit avec Emilio Gutierrez (ITAM)
We develop and test a model of environmental regulation that integrates firm and regulator
behavior to evaluate a voluntary certification program : the Mexican Clean Industry Program.
Imposing structure on the costs of participation and compliance we first establish that plants with
lower compliance costs are more likely to certify. Then, we show that because authorities seem
to use certification as a screening device, the program leads to higher levels and more efficient
targeting of inspections. Using remotely sensed estimates of local air quality we find evidence
that is consistent with the model and suggests that the Clean Industry Program had little impact
on emissions of firms that certified but reduced emissions overall as a result of the regulatory
response that certification made possible.
Economic History Seminar
Du 09/03/2016 de 12:30 à 14:00
Campus jourdan,Bâtiment A, Rez de chaussée, Salle 4
CARLO TAVIANI (University of Cape Town)
A Genealogy of the Global Corporations? The Casa di San Giorgio and the Fortune of its Model. *
Applied Economics Lunch Seminar
Du 08/03/2016 de 12:30 à 13:30
Campus jourdan,Bâtiment A, Rez de chaussée, Salle 4
LAVEST Chloé (CAE)
Children and Gender Inequality: Evidence from Denmark
écrit avec Henrik Jacobsen Kleven, London School of Economics and Jakob Egholt Søgaard, University of Copenhagen
Despite considerable gender convergence over time, substantial gender inequality persists
in all countries. Using Danish administrative data from 1980-2011, we show that most of the
remaining gender inequality can be attributed to the dynamic effects of having children. The
arrival of children leads to a long-run penalty in female earnings of 21% driven in roughly
equal proportions by labor force participation, hours of work, and wage rates. Underlying
this child penalty, we find clear dynamic effects of child birth on occupation, promotion to
manager, and the family friendliness of the firm for women relative to men. The fraction of
aggregate gender inequality that can be explained by children is strongly increasing over time—
from 30% in 1980 to 80% in 2011—showing that non-child reasons for gender inequality have
largely disappeared. Conditional on rich observables, the female child penalty in earnings is
increasing in the relative skill of the female in the family, suggesting that mechanisms other than
comparative advantage are at play. We probe into the potential role of “gender identity” effects
by showing that the female child penalty is strongly related to the relative labor supply history
of her parents. This is consistent with the notion that gender attitudes surrounding family and
career are shaped in part by the environment in which individuals grow up.
Roy Seminar (ADRES)
Du 07/03/2016 de 17:00 à 18:30
Campus jourdan,Bâtiment A, Rez de chaussée, Salle 4
JACKSON Matt (Stanford University)
Changes in Social Networks in Response to Exposure to Formal Markets
Paris Game Theory Seminar
Du 07/03/2016 de 11:00 à 12:00
salle 01 (rez-de-chaussée) au Centre Emile Borel de l'Institut Henri Poincaré, 11 rue Pierre et Marie Curie, Paris 5ème
RADY Sven (*)
Casual Friday Development Seminar - Brown Bag Seminar
Du 04/03/2016 de 12:45 à 13:45
Campus jourdan,Bâtiment A, Rez de chaussée, Salle 4
COMBLON Virginie (DIAL)
Gender asymmetries in labor supply responses to health shocks in Senegal
écrit avec Karine Marazyan (IEDES)
PSI-PSE (Petit Séminaire Informel de la Paris School of Economics) Seminar
Du 01/03/2016 de 17:00 à 18:30
Campus jourdan,Bâtiment A, Rez de chaussée, Salle 4
BEKKOUCHE Yasmine (PSE)
SEGù Mariona()
Yasmine Bekkouche - School quality in Sub-Saharan Africa, a comparative study
Mariona Segù - Taxing vacant apartments. Can fiscal policy reduce vacancy?
Applied Economics Lunch Seminar
Du 01/03/2016 de 12:30 à 13:30
Campus jourdan,Bâtiment A, Rez de chaussée, Salle 4
GONZALES GARCIA Ignacio (Economics Departement EUI)
Tobin's Q and Inequality