Calendrier du mois de septembre 2024
| Programme de la semaine précédente | Programme de la semaine | Programme de la semaine suivante | |
| (du 2024-06-17 au 2024-06-24) | (du 2024-06-24 au 2024-06-30) | (du 2024-06-30 au 2024-07-07) |
Semaine du 2024-06-24 au 2024-06-30 |
Casual Friday Development Seminar - Brown Bag Seminar
Du 28/06/2024 de 13:00 à 14:00
R1-15
DIAZ Oscar Mauricio(PSE)
DIAZ Oscar Mauricio(PSE)
LOUBES Romaine(PSE)
*
brown bag Travail et Économie Publique
Du 27/06/2024 de 12:30 à 13:30
PSE- 48 boulevard Jourdan, 74014 Paris, salle R1-15
PAUL-VENTURINE Julia ()
Mayors strike back: Evidence from the removal of floor area ratios in France
écrit avec Guillaume Chapelle (CYU, LIEPP) and Camille Urvoy (Mannheim)
Land use regulations have been pointed out as a major factor of housing scarcity, contributing to high prices and reducing agglomeration economies. Yet most studies use aggregated measures at the municipalities level and little is known about the impact of specific regulatory tools at a fine scale. In this paper, we investigate the impact of the removal of all floor to area ratios (FAR) by decision of the central state in 2014 in France. FAR limits housing surface on a plot according to the plot surface. Its removal aimed at increasing density by allowing more construction. To identify its impact on the Paris metropolitan area, we use a difference-in-difference framework comparing housing blocks where a maximum FAR existed before the reform with close blocks where no FAR existed.
Yet, we find that most treated areas did not see a significative change in housing density compared to non-treated ones. Using a panel of disaggregated land use regulations, we explain that it triggered an endogenous regulatory backlash from the mayors. They quickly compensated for the disappearance of FAR using alternate tools that still were available such as maximum heights and area coverage. Treated residential areas saw a small but insignificant decrease in their density compared to untreated ones, while treated semi-residential areas — that gather single-family housing and low-rise multi-family units — saw a significant decrease in density compared to non-treated areas of the same type. Indeed, they were the most at risk of densification. We interpret this impact as suggesting that mayors revised their local plans to reassure their constituents against the threat of devaluation of their house if more density were to be allowed. Ours results confirm that the home voter hypothesis and NIMBYsm are still important drivers of land use restrictions today. They also contribute to the debate optimal governance level for housing policies.
TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar
Du 27/06/2024 de 12:30 à 13:30
R2-20
WEBER Giacomo (PSE)
Coarse Agents and Intergroup Phenomena
This paper proposes a framework for analyzing intergroup phenomena. We consider heterogeneous agents divided into two groups. Agents are paired to play normal-form two-player games under complete information. When opponents belong to the same group (in-group), players form correct expectations about their behavior. Conversely, players form coarse expectations when their opponent is from the out-group. In equilibrium, these coarse expectations must coincide with the average behavior observed in the out-group. We apply this framework to an organizational setting where the groups represent subdivisions, and each game corresponds to a team task. These tasks are assumed to exhibit strategic complementarities. An omniscient designer assigns agents to teams in a way that maximizes the overall probability of task success. Our study focuses on the optimal assignment strategy, emphasizing the role of coarse expectations. We also discuss further economic applications
Histoire des entreprises et de la finance
Du 26/06/2024 de 16:00 à 17:30
R2.20
COULOUMIES Quentin Belot (IESEG)
Piercing the holding veil to enter family capital. inancialization dynamics and structures pf Peugeot capital accumulation, 1965-2019
Economic History Seminar
Du 26/06/2024 de 12:00 à 13:30
R1-15
CAGé Julia()
THOMAS Catherine(London School of Economics)
Le début de la fin de la tripartition? Elections européennes et inégalités sociales en France, 1994-2024
*
PSI-PSE (Petit Séminaire Informel de la Paris School of Economics) Seminar
Du 25/06/2024 de 17:00 à 18:00
R1-15
TURQUIER Rémi (PSE)
Research ideas on pandemic preparedness
Applied Economics Lunch Seminar
Du 25/06/2024 de 12:30 à 13:30
Salle R2-20
ROUX Baptiste (PSE)
In Search of Working Time ? Exploring the Structure of Hour Constraints
This paper focuses on the phenomenon of work hour constraints, i.e the inability for individuals to work their desired number of hours. Survey evidence indicates that a sizeable 32% of part-time workers and 18% of full-time workers would ideally work more hours at a given wage rate. While previous research has often portrayed these constraints as firm-level issues driven by organizational and productivity needs, there is limited understanding of the individual factors contributing to these constraints. Combining survey and administrative data in the case of France, I provide new individual-level evidence on the origins and consequences of hour constraints. First, I find that a majority of constrained workers are employed in jobs with heterogeneity in working hours, with some coworkers with some coworkers working their preferred schedules. This suggests that hour constraints are not solely due to firm-specific rigidities but also involve a worker-level bargaining dimension. Second, I study the relation between constraints and labor market transitions. I implement a machine learning approach to predict hour constraints in panel data and focus on transition outcomes. I find that a higher probability to be constrained from above is associated with more transitions, higher increases in hours worked, and no significant effect on hourly wages.
Roy Seminar (ADRES)
Du 24/06/2024 de 17:00 à 18:15
R1-15
NUNEZ Mathias (CREST - Ecole Polytechnique)
Price & Choose
écrit avec Federico Echenique, Berkeley
We describe a sequential mechanism that fully implements the set of efficient outcomes in environments with quasi-linear utilities. The mechanism asks agents to take turns defining prices for each outcome, with a final player choosing an outcome for all: Price & Choose. The choice triggers a sequence of payments, from each agent to the preceding agent. We present several extensions. First, payoff inequalities may be reduced by endogenizing the order of play. Second, our results extend to a model without quasi-linear utility, to a setting with an outside option, robustness to max-min behavior, and caps on prices.