Calendrier du 04 octobre 2021
Roy Seminar (ADRES)
Du 04/10/2021 de 17:00 à 18:15
Salle R2-21 - Campus Jourdan - 75014 PARIS
SINANDER Ludvig (Oxford)
Agenda-manipulation in ranking
A committee ranks a set of alternatives by sequentially voting on pairs, in an order chosen by the committee’s chair. Although the chair has no knowledge of voters’ preferences, we show that she can do as well as if she had perfect information. We characterise strategies with this ‘regret-freeness’ property in two ways: (1) they are efficient, and (2) they avoid two intuitive errors. One regret-free strategy is a sorting algorithm called insertion sort. We show that it is characterised by a lexicographic property, and is outcome-equivalent to a recursive variant of the much-studied amendment procedure.
Econometrics Seminar
Du 04/10/2021 de 16:00 à 17:15
MOREIRA Humberto (Fundação Getulio Vargas’ Brazilian School of Economics and Finance)
Efficiency Loss of Asymptotically Efficient Tests in An Instrumental Variables Regression + Optimal Invariant Tests in an Instrumental Variables Regression With Heteroskedastic and Autocorrelated Errors
écrit avec Co-authors: Geert Ridder and Mahrad Sharifvaghefi
Régulation et Environnement
Du 04/10/2021 de 12:00 à 13:15
Salle R2-21 - Campus Jourdan - 75014 PARIS
NOCKE Volker (University of Mannheim)
Consumer Search and Choice Overload
écrit avec REY Patrick
We consider a multiproduct seller facing consumers who must search to learn prices and valuations. The equilibrium features choice overload: the larger the product line, the fewer consumers start searching. We provide conditions under which the seller offers too much or too little variety. We then allow the seller to position products or make recommendations, thereby introducing the possibility of directed search, and show that the seller may find it profitable to maintain some noise. Finally, we study the sellerís incentive to disclose product identity and extend our analysis to that of a platform choosing which sellers to host.