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Programme de la semaine


Liste des séminaires

Les séminaires mentionnés ici sont ouverts principalement aux chercheurs et doctorants et sont consacrés à des présentations de recherches récentes. Les enseignements, séminaires et groupes de travail spécialisés offerts dans le cadre des programmes de master sont décrits dans la rubrique formation.

Les séminaires d'économie

Applied Economics Lunch Seminar

Atelier Histoire Economique

Behavior seminar

Behavior Working Group

brown bag Travail et Économie Publique

Casual Friday Development Seminar - Brown Bag Seminar

Development Economics Seminar

Economic History Seminar

Economics and Complexity Lunch Seminar

Economie industrielle

EPCI (Economie politique du changement institutionnel) Seminar

Football et sciences sociales : les footballeurs entre institutions et marchés

GSIELM (Graduate Students International Economics and Labor Market) Lunch Seminar

Histoire des entreprises et de la finance

Industrial Organization

Job Market Seminar

Macro Retreat

Macro Workshop

Macroeconomics Seminar

NGOs, Development and Globalization

Paris Game Theory Seminar

Paris Migration Seminar

Paris Seminar in Demographic Economics

Paris Trade Seminar

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

PhD Conferences

Propagation Mechanisms

PSI-PSE (Petit Séminaire Informel de la Paris School of Economics) Seminar

Regional and urban economics seminar

Régulation et Environnement

RISK Working Group

Roy Seminar (ADRES)

Séminaire d'Economie et Psychologie

The Construction of Economic History Working Group

Theory Working Group

TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar

Travail et économie publique externe

WIP (Work in progress) Working Group

Les séminaires de sociologie, anthropologie, histoire et pluridisciplinaires

Casse-croûte socio

Déviances et contrôle social : Approche interdisciplinaire des déviances et des institutions pénales

Dispositifs éducatifs, socialisation, inégalités

La discipline au travail. Qu’est-ce que le salariat ?

Méthodes quantitatives en sociologie

Modélisation et méthodes statistiques en sciences sociales

Objectiver la souffrance

Sciences sociales et immigration

Archives d'économie

Accumulation, régulation, croissance et crise

Commerce international appliqué

Conférences PSE

Economie du travail et inégalités

Economie industrielle

Economie monétaire internationale

Economie publique et protection sociale

Groupe de modélisation en macroéconomie

Groupe de travail : Economie du travail et inégalités

Groupe de travail : Macroeconomic Tea Break

Groupe de travail : Risques

Health Economics Working Group

Journée de la Fédération Paris-Jourdan

Lunch séminaire Droit et Economie

Marché du travail et inégalités

Risques et protection sociale

Séminaire de Recrutement de Professeur Assistant

Seminaire de recrutement sénior

SemINRAire

Archives de sociologie, anthropologie, histoire et pluridisciplinaires

Conférence du Centre de Théorie et d'Analyse du Droit

Espace social des inégalités contemporaines. La constitution de l'entre-soi

Etudes halbwachsiennes

Familles, patrimoines, mobilités

Frontières de l'anthropologie

L'auto-fabrication des sociétés : population, politiques sociales, santé

La Guerre des Sciences Sociales

Population et histoire politique au XXe siècle

Pratiques et méthodes de la socio-histoire du politique

Pratiques quantitatives de la sociologie

Repenser la solidarité au 21e siècle

Séminaire de l'équipe ETT du CMH

Séminaire ethnographie urbaine

Sociologie économique

Terrains et religion


Calendrier du 10 mars 2022

Macroeconomics Seminar

Du 10/03/2022 de 16:00 à 17:15

PSE- 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris, salle R2-01

RENNE Jean-Paul (HEC Lausanne)

FISCAL LIMITS AND THE PRICING OF EUROBONDS



écrit avec KEVIN PALLARA




This paper proposes a methodology to price bonds jointly issued by a group of countries—Eurobonds in the euro-area context. We consider two types of bonds: the first is backed by several and joint (SJG) guarantees, the second features several but not joint (SNJG) guarantees. The pricing of SJG and SNJG bonds reflects different assumptions regarding the pooling of debtors’ fiscal resources. We estimate fiscal limits for the four largest euro-area economies over 2008-2021 and deduce counterfactual Eurobond prices. Amid the euro-debt crisis, 5-year SNJG bond yield spreads would have been about three times larger than SJG ones. Hence, issuing SJG bonds would result in gains at the ag-gregate level. We finally show that (i) the gains stemming from the issuance of SJG bonds could be shared among countries through post-issuance redistribu- tion schemes and that (ii) these schemes may alleviate the reduction in market discipline resulting from common bonds issuances.



Texte intégral

brown bag Travail et Économie Publique

Du 10/03/2022 de 12:30 à 13:30

PSE- 48 boulevard Jourdan, 74014 Paris, salle R1-09

VIDALENC Basile (PSE)

Optimal Eligibility for Unemployment Benefits





A minimum employment history is usually an eligibility condition to receive unemployment benefits. This paper characterizes its optimal level when unemployment risks are heterogeneous. First, by modeling the trajectory of workers on the labor market, I show that the optimal requirement follows a selection versus moral hazard in employment and unemployment trade-off. Second, thanks to french administrative data, I identify the behavioral responses to a requirement variation by using a bunching method and a regression kink design. These statistics are sufficient to assess the welfare implications of an eligibility change and to bound the optimal requirement. An eligibility reform has heterogeneous welfare implications within the labor force and its overall effect depends on the risk distribution and on frictions.

TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar

Du 10/03/2022 de 12:30 à 13:30

Salle R1.15, Campus Jourdan 75014 Paris

HAGENBACH Jeanne (Sciences Po)

Motivated vs. Skeptical Beliefs



écrit avec Charlotte Saucet (University Paris 1)




This experiment aims at studying how individuals reconcile the formation of equilibrium beliefs and the formation of motivated beliefs in strategic settings of asymmetric information. Subjects play several rounds of Sender-Receiver disclosure games, in which the Receiver's equilibrium beliefs are skeptical. The experimental treatments affect whether or not the Receiver has intrinsic preferences over what he/she believes. We then vary whether the skeptical beliefs are aligned or not with the Receiver's preferred beliefs. We show that the Receivers' level of skepticism is lower when the skeptical beliefs are self-threatening than when Receivers have no preferences over beliefs. When the skeptical beliefs are self-serving, skepticism is not significantly enhanced compared to the case where Receivers have no preferences over beliefs. We investigate the role of Receivers' IQ and priors on the beliefs they form.

Behavior seminar

Du 10/03/2022 de 11:00 à 12:00

Salle R2.21, Campus Jourdan 75014 Paris

VAN DE WEELE Joël (University of Amsterdam)

Anticipatory Anxiety and Wishful Thinking



écrit avec with Jan Engelmann, Mael Lebreton, Nahuel Salem-Garcia and Peter Schwardmann




It is widely hypothesized that anxiety about adverse future outcomes motivates people to adopt comforting beliefs or to engage in wishful thinking. However, there is little direct causal evidence for this effect. In a first experiment, participants perform a visual pattern recognition task where some patterns may result in the delivery of an electric shock, a proven way of inducing anxiety. Participants engage in significant wishful thinking: they are less likely to correctly identify patterns that they know may lead to a shock. A second and third experiment establish that participants also engage in wishful thinking in anticipation of monetary losses and that the phenomenon is robust to another perceptual task, which draws on different cognitive processes. Across our three experiments, greater ambiguity of the visual evidence is associated with more wishful thinking. Our within-subject design allows us to detect wishful thinking at the individual level. We find that wishful thinking is heterogeneous across and stable within individuals.