Calendrier du 22 novembre 2018
Macroeconomics Seminar
Du 22/11/2018 de 15:45 à 17:00
PSE - 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris, salle R2-21
MALHERBE Frederic (UCL)
Financial sector origins of economic growth delusion
écrit avec Michael McMahon
Texte intégral
Football et sciences sociales : les footballeurs entre institutions et marchés
Du 22/11/2018 de 14:30 à 15:30
Salle R1-15, campus Jourdan - 75014 Paris
FEUILLET Antoine(Université de Caen)
TIA Pierre-Cédric(Université du Maine)
Football et droits médias - enjeux et perspectives
PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group
Du 22/11/2018 de 12:30 à 14:00
salle R2-01, campus Jourdan - 48 bd Jourdan 75014 Paris
YANG David (Harvard University)
The Impact of Media Censorship: 1984 or Brave New World?
écrit avec Yuyu CHEN
Media censorship is a hallmark of authoritarian regimes. We conduct a field experiment in China to measure the effects of providing citizens with access to an uncensored Internet. We track subjects' media consumption, beliefs regarding the media, economic beliefs, political attitudes, and behaviors over 18 months. We find 4 main results: (i)free access alone does not induce subjects to acquire politically sensitive information; (ii) temporary encouragement leads to a persistent increase in acquisition, indicating that demand is not permanently low; (iii) acquisition brings broad, substantial, and persistent changes to knowledge, beliefs, attitudes, and intended behaviors; and (iv)social transmission of information is statistically significant but small in magnitude. We calibrate a simple model to show that the combination of low demand for uncensored information and the moderate social transmission means China's censorship apparatus may remain robust to a large number of citizens receiving access to an uncensored Internet
TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar
Du 22/11/2018 de 12:30 à 13:30
salle R2-20, campus Jourdan - 48 bd Jourdan, 75014 Paris
TALLON Jean-Marc (PSE)
Tailored recommendations
brown bag Travail et Économie Publique
Du 22/11/2018 de 12:30 à 13:30
BUHAI Sebastian (CEPREMAP)
Worker-Firm Dynamics with Seniority Bargaining
écrit avec Co-authors: M. Portela and C. Teulings
We provide microfoundations for why worker seniority (a worker’s tenure relative to the tenure of all her co-workers inside a firm) is an optimal bargaining device in large firms with stochastic product demand and irreversible specific investments required for each new hire. The firm and its workers simultaneously bargain for a layoff order and a wage schedule, whereupon infra-marginal senior workers receive wage premia and layoff insurance relative to their more junior colleagues—extending the one firm-one worker efficient bargaining real option model by Buhai and Teulings (2014). We then validate our modeling framework on exhaustive linked-employer-employee-data from Denmark and Portugal by proving that the seniority profile in worker wages, empirically documented by Buhai et al (2014) using the same data, is a proxy for the “cost of necessary specific investments”—with the latter a structural parameter that we estimate for each narrowly defined industry.