Calendrier du mois de octobre 2014
PSI-PSE (Petit Séminaire Informel de la Paris School of Economics) Seminar
Du 29/10/2014 de 17:00 à 18:00
MSE - salle B2.2
BECARD Yvan (PSE)
Procyclical leverage and Business Cycles
WIP (Work in progress) Working Group
Du 29/10/2014 de 11:00 à 12:30
WIP (WORK IN PROGRESS)
meeting WIP
écrit avec Brice Fabre (The trade-off between taxes and fees: evidence from French municipalities) Jonathan Goupille (Behavioral responses to inheritance tax: Evidence from notches in France) Georges Vivien Houngbonon (Why firms may set higher price markups)
Casual Friday Development Seminar - Brown Bag Seminar
Du 24/10/2014 de 12:45 à 13:45
Campus jourdan,Bâtiment G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 8
DANIELE Gianmarco (VRIJE UNIVERSITEIT BRUSSEL)
Street vendors, incentives and self-regulation: a field study in urban India
écrit avec Co-author(s) : Denni TOMMASI (ULB)
PSI-PSE (Petit Séminaire Informel de la Paris School of Economics) Seminar
Du 21/10/2014 de 17:00 à 18:00
Campus jourdan,Bâtiment B, 2e étage, Salle de Réunions
FERRIERE Nathalie (PSE)
Food Aid Allocation: Competition or Coordination?
PSI-PSE (Petit Séminaire Informel de la Paris School of Economics) Seminar
Du 15/10/2014 de 17:00 à 18:00
MSE - salle B2.2
MOHAMED Imen Ben (PSE)
Credit shocks, wage bargaining and monetary policy : a DSGE approach
Development Economics Seminar
Du 15/10/2014 de 17:00 à 18:30
Campus jourdan,Bâtiment G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 8
PATNAM Manassa (ENSAE-CREST)
Targeted transfers, inequality, and poverty outcomes from the break up of states : evidence from the réorganization of states in India
écrit avec Co-author(s) : Amrita DHILLON, Pramila KRISHNAN, and Carlo PERRONI
We describe a model of targeted redistribution choices by a self-interested incumbent politician, and use it to derive predictions about public good provision levels and poverty outcomes following secession of a region from a political union. Secession of one of those other regions, by removing private rent-seeking incentives for the incumbent, reduces targeted redistribution in the seceded jurisdiction, raising public good provision and improving the distribution of welfare. The model's predictions are examined in light of evidence on inequality and poverty outcomes following the political break-up that resulted in the creation three new Indian states. We use satellite data on night-time lights to proxy for economic activity across new and old state borders. Employing a regression discontinuity design we find a significant decrease in inequality in new states post break-up. Our result indicate that this effect is driven entirely by a decrease in inequality amongst natural resource poor regions in the new states, post break-up.
Roy Seminar (ADRES)
Du 13/10/2014 de 17:00 à 18:15
MSE(106-112, boulevard de l'Hôpital - Salle du 6ème étage) 75647 Paris Cedex 13
SZALAY Dezso (BONN)
Smooth, strategic communication
We study strategic information transmission in a Sender-Receiver game where players' optimal actions depend on the realization of multiple signals but the players disagree on the relative importance of each piece of news. We characterize a statistical environment - featuring symmetric loss functions and elliptically distributed parameters - in which the Sender's expected utility depends only on the first moment of his posterior. Despite disagreement about the use of underlying signals, we demonstrate the existence of equilibria in differentiable strategies in which the Sender can credibly communicate posterior means. The existence of smooth communication equilibria depends on the relative usefulness of the signal structure to Sender and Receiver, respectively. We characterize extensive forms in which the quality of information is optimally designed of equal importance to Sender and Receiver so that the best equilibrium in terms of ex ante expected payoffs is a smooth communication equilibrium. The quality of smooth equilibrium communication is entirely determined by the correlation of interests. Senders with better aligned preferences are endogenously endowed with better information and therefore give more accurate advice.
Texte intégral
Brown Bag Economics of Innovation Seminar
Du 13/10/2014 de 17:00 à 18:15
MSE(106-112, boulevard de l'Hôpital - Salle du 6ème étage) 75647 Paris Cedex 13
SZALAY Dezso (BONN)
Brown Bag Economics of Innovation Seminar
We study strategic information transmission in a Sender-Receiver game where players' optimal actions depend on the realization of multiple signals but the players disagree on the relative importance of each piece of news. We characterize a statistical environment - featuring symmetric loss functions and elliptically distributed parameters - in which the Sender's expected utility depends only on the first moment of his posterior. Despite disagreement about the use of underlying signals, we demonstrate the existence of equilibria in differentiable strategies in which the Sender can credibly communicate posterior means. The existence of smooth communication equilibria depends on the relative usefulness of the signal structure to Sender and Receiver, respectively. We characterize extensive forms in which the quality of information is optimally designed of equal importance to Sender and Receiver so that the best equilibrium in terms of ex ante expected payoffs is a smooth communication equilibrium. The quality of smooth equilibrium communication is entirely determined by the correlation of interests. Senders with better aligned preferences are endogenously endowed with better information and therefore give more accurate advice.
Casual Friday Development Seminar - Brown Bag Seminar
Du 10/10/2014 de 12:30 à 13:30
Campus jourdan,Bâtiment G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 8
MURARD Elie (PSE)
The impact of migration on family left-behind: estimation in presence of intra-household selection of migrants
PSI-PSE (Petit Séminaire Informel de la Paris School of Economics) Seminar
Du 07/10/2014 de 17:00 à 18:30
Campus jourdan,Bâtiment B, 2e étage, Salle de Réunions
écrit avec GOUPILLE Jonathan (PSE) : "Behavioral responses to inheritance tax: Evidence from notches in France" Brice FABRE (PSE) : "The trade-off between taxes and fees: evidence from French municipalities"
EPCI (Economie politique du changement institutionnel) Seminar
Du 07/10/2014 de 16:30 à 18:00
MSE (106-112, blv de l'Hôpital - Room 19) 75013 Paris
PALME Joakim (UPPSALA UNIVERSITY, SWEDEN)
The Paradox of Redistribution Revisited
écrit avec Discussant: Elvire Guillaud (University Paris 1, CES)
Welfare States come with different aims. To reduce poverty and inequality figures as a prominent goal, especially in times of rising inequalities. How do we design welfare states to work well as strategies of equality? The ‘Paradox of Redistribution’ (Korpi and Palme, 1998) stated that the more we target benefits at the poor only and the more concerned we are with creating equality via equal public transfers to all, the less likely we are to reduce poverty and inequality. Comparative data for a number of OECD countries concerning the situation in the mid-1980s appeared to be congruent with this hypothesis. More recently, a series of studies seem to call this finding into question. The aim of the present paper is not only to check the validity of some of these claims but also to discuss the political economy argument behind the paradox, examine measurement problems and outline alternative approaches to the study of the relationship between the welfare state and equality. It is argued that we can learn a lot more by (i) putting the generosity and distributive profile of benefit programs into the context of the political economy of the welfare state, (ii) being more specific about program design and target populations, (iii) broadening the perspective of policy instruments, and (iv) extending the accounting framework in order to capture also the 'horizontal' and 'risk' redistributions in addition to the 'vertical' one.
Roy Seminar (ADRES)
Du 06/10/2014 de 17:00 à 18:15
MSE (106-112, boulevard de l'Hôpital - Salle du 6ème étage) 75647 PARIS cedex 13
HOPKINS Ed (EDINBURGH SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS)
Inequality, Gender and Risk-Taking Behaviour
This paper investigates social influences on attitudes to risk and offers a theoretical explanation of how risk-taking varies with gender, relative position and inequality. Individuals about to participate in a tournament may take fair gambles even though they are risk averse in both consumption and tournament rewards. While this risk-taking is increasing in the equality of initial endowments, it is found here that it is increasing in the inequality of rewards in the tournament. Indeed, the poorest will be risk loving if the value of the worst reward is sufficiently low. Further, the level of equality of wealth that is compatible with stability, that is gives no incentive to gamble, is increasing in the equality of rewards. Thus, inequality in rewards can cause inequality in wealth. Finally, in a marriage-matching version of the tournament, it is found that the more numerous gender will be more risk taking.
GSIELM (Graduate Students International Economics and Labor Market) Lunch Seminar
Du 06/10/2014 de 12:00 à 13:00
MSE Room S19
PEDRONO Justine (AIX MARSEILLE SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS)
Banking leverage with two funding currencies
PSI-PSE (Petit Séminaire Informel de la Paris School of Economics) Seminar
Du 01/10/2014 de 17:00 à 18:00
MSE (106-112, boulevard de l'Hôpital - Salle B 2.2) 75647 Paris Cedex 13
BARTAL Mehdi (PSE)
A Subsidy To Reduce Layoffs: Is It Effective?
Development Economics Seminar
Du 01/10/2014 de 17:00 à 18:30
Campus jourdan,Bâtiment G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 8
SOMANATHAN Rohini (DELHI SHOOL OF ECONOMICS)
Community contracts: An experimental investigation of rule formation in Indian villages
écrit avec Co-author(s) : Karla Hoff and Pontus Strimling
WIP (Work in progress) Working Group
Du 01/10/2014 de 11:00 à 12:30
Campus jourdan, Bâtiment G, Rez de chaussée, Salle 10
WIP (Work In Progress) ()
meeting WIP
écrit avec Andrea Garnero(doctorant PSE : Workforce diversity and productivity in France) Damien Vandendriessche (doctorant PSE : Can we measure happiness? The impact of framing effects) Clémentine Van Effenterre (doctorante PSE : Understanding the gender gap in science - Evidence from France)