Calendrier du mois de mars 2017
Casual Friday Development Seminar - Brown Bag Seminar
Du 31/03/2017 de 12:45 à 13:45
Salle R2-01, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
GIGNOUX Jérémie (PSE)
Implementation and impacts of input subsidies for annual crops, evidence from Haïti
écrit avec Karen Macours, Kelsey Wright et Dan Stein
TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar
Du 30/03/2017 de 13:00 à 14:00
Salle R1-11, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
STEPANOV Sergey (Higher School of Economics )
Reputation and information aggregation.
Travail et économie publique externe
Du 30/03/2017 de 13:00 à 14:15
Salle R2-07, Nouveau Bâtiment, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
DOYLE Joseph (MIT Sloan School of Management)
The First 2,000 Days and Child Skills: Evidence from a Randomized Experiment of Home Visiting
Using a randomized experiment in Ireland, this study investigates the impact of sustained investment in parenting from pregnancy until age five on children’s development. Providing the Preparing for Life program, which incorporates a home visiting program, group parenting classes, and baby massage classes, to disadvantaged families raises children’s cognitive scores by one-third of a standard deviation on average (0.21-0.81) and non-cognitive scores by one-fifth of a standard deviation (0.19-0.41). The sizes of the effects exceed current meta-analytic estimations. Heterogeneous effects by gender and parity indicate few differential effects by gender and stronger gains for firstborns. Results are robust to small sample size, differential attrition, multiple hypothesis testing, and contamination.
Behavior seminar
Du 30/03/2017 de 12:00 à 13:00
Salle R2-21, Nouveau Bâtiment, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
STABILE Mark (INSEAD)
Explaining the Rise in C-sections: the contributions of physician incentives and research spillovers
Cesarean section rates are historically high in Canada as they are across the OECD. We investigate the roles of physician incentives and spillover effects of a major research trial on breech deliveries. We find that doubling the relative compensation of C-sections over vaginal deliveries increases the probability of a C-section by at most four percentage points. We also show that the publication of the “Hannah Term Breech Trial” had spillover effects on the C-section rate for vertex births. The secular increase in the C-section rate is largely accounted for by observable characteristics of births, mothers and health care systems.
Du 29/03/2017 de 16:30 à 18:00
Salle R2-01, campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
VANDE WALLE Dominique (The World Bank ) Are Poor Individuals Mainly Found in Poor Households ? Evidence from Nutrition Data for Africa ; écrit avec Caitlin Brown, Martin Ravallion and Dominique van de Walle
La séance est annulée
Economic History Seminar
Du 29/03/2017 de 12:30 à 14:00
Campus Jourdan (nouveau bâtiment) Salle R2-20
FERRIE Joseph (Northwestern)
Intergenerational Mobility in the US, 1850-2015 : Income and Educational attainment across six Generations
Applied Economics Lunch Seminar
Du 28/03/2017 de 12:30 à 13:30
Salle R2-01, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
WALDENSTROM Daniel (Paris School of Economics)
Global earnings inequality, 1970-2015: Evidence from a new database
Roy Seminar (ADRES)
Du 27/03/2017 de 17:00 à 18:30
Salle R1-15, Nouveau Bâtiment, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
ECHENIQUE Frederico (CalTech)
On multiple discount rates
écrit avec Chris Chambers
Disagreements over long-term projects can often be traced to assumptions about the discount rate. The debate in economics over climate change is a case in point. We propose a theory of intertemporal choice that is robust to specific assumptions on the discount rate. Our discussion is centered around three models: The PARETO model requires that one utility stream be chosen over another if and only if its discounted value is higher for all discount factors in a set of possible factors. The UTILITARIAN model focuses on an average discount factor. The MAXMIN model evaluates a ow by the lowest available discounted value. We propose these models as robust decision criteria for intertemporal choice, investigate their properties, and break them down axiomatically.
GSIELM (Graduate Students International Economics and Labor Market) Lunch Seminar
Du 27/03/2017 de 13:00 à 14:00
MSE(106, Blv de l'Hôpital, salle S/19) 75013 Paris
ÖZGÜZEL Cem (CES & IZA)
Learn and Return: Learn and Return: Productive Knowledge Diffusion through Migrant Workers
Régulation et Environnement
Du 27/03/2017 de 12:00 à 14:00
Salle R1-15, Nouveau Bâtiment, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
PLANTINGA Andrew (Bren School of Environmental Science and Management - UC Santa Barbara)
Salience and the Government Provision of Public Goods
écrit avec Matthew Wibbenmeyer et Sarah Anderson
This paper examines the consequences of salience for the government provision of public goods.
Salience is a common behavioral bias whereby people's attention is drawn to salient features of a
decision problem, leading them to overweight prominent information in subsequent judgments.
We analyze the case in which the public's demand for the good is distorted by salient events,
and explore how salience influences public good allocation and efficiency. Theoretical predictions
regarding public good allocation are ambiguous and depend on the magnitude of the change
in payoffs and the extent of salience effects. We test whether salience increases or decreases
allocation of government projects to reduce wildfire severity near wildland-adjacent communities.
Even though the occurrence of a wildfire likely reduces the severity of future fires in the same
area, it may increase the likelihood that fuels management projects are placed nearby if wildfire
events strongly increase the salience of losses under future fires. We find strong evidence that
the salience e ects increase the likelihood of fuels management projects, and use robustness
checks to eliminate competing explanations for our results. Our salience framework may also
offer insights into government responses to terrorism, natural disasters, disease outbreaks, and
environmental catastrophes.
Casual Friday Development Seminar - Brown Bag Seminar
Du 24/03/2017 de 12:45 à 13:45
SARDOSCHAU Sulin (PSE) *;
La séance est annulée
Travail et économie publique externe
Du 23/03/2017 de 13:00 à 14:15
Salle R2-07, Nouveau Bâtiment, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
BELZIL Christian (Ecole polytechnique et ENSAE)
Estimating the Value of Higher Education Financial Aid: Evidence from a Field Experiment
TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar
Du 23/03/2017 de 13:00 à 14:00
Salle R1-11, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
WOODWARD Kyle (University of North Carolina )
Equilibrium and Approximation in Auction-Like Models
I define auction-like models with continuum actions to satisfy a number of conditions which are met in common auction contexts, when action spaces are appropriately constrained. In these models, I prove that there exists a monotone pure-strategy Bayesian-Nash euqilibrium. The proof of equilibrium existence constructs equilibrium as a limit of equilibria of nearby discretized models, which implies that utility-relevant observable functions of actions are converging in probability to the continuum-action limit. The conditions defining auction- like models are intuitive: first, bidder utility cannot be adversely affected by small upward deviations; second, with small deviations bidders can guarantee themselves nearly the utility at a limit of strategies in the limit of the deviated strategies; third, if one bidder is discontinuously worse off in a limit of strategies, some other bidder is occasionally better off. Under mild additional conditions, the action space constraints are irrelevant, and the limiting strategies are an equilibrium in the unconstrained continuum-action model. I use these results to prove the existence of pure-strategy equilibria in divisible-good pay-as-bid auctions with private information, heterogeneous agents, and generic decreasing value functions. Equilibrium approximation implies that the distribution of observed allocations and seller revenue in discrete auctions may be close to the distribution of these outcomes predicted by the divisible-good model.
Behavior seminar
Du 23/03/2017 de 12:00 à 13:00
Salle R2-01, Nouveau Bâtiment, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
GALIZZI Matteo (London School of Economics)
Temporal stability, cross-validity, and external validity of risk-taking measures: experimental evidence from a UK representative sample
We conduct an “artefactual” field experiment to incorporate different risk taking measures within the Innovation Panel (IP) of the UK Household Longitudinal Survey (UKHLS). We randomly allocate to an experimental module a nationally representative sample of 661 adult respondents to the IP Wave 6 (IP6) who complete the incentive-compatible tasks by Holt and Laury (2002) and by Binswanger (1980) and Eckel and Grossman (2008). They also respond to the survey questions by Dohmen et al. (2011) for self-reported willingness to take risks in general, in finance, and in health. One year later (IP7) the same measures are repeated for 411 of these respondents. This design allows us to systematically test the validity of the measures along three dimensions. First, we look at cross-validity by investigating their associations at one point in time. Second, we look at temporal stability by comparing the responses between IP6 and IP7. Third, we look at external validity by considering a range of health and financial behaviors. Concerning cross validity, we find evidence that the different risk taking measures correlate and map into each other, although only imperfectly. When the analysis accounts for individual observed heterogeneity and for the appropriate degree of nonlinearity, the experimental measures of risk aversion and the self-reported willingness to take risks predict each other. About temporal stability, we find significant persistence of the measures over time. Finally, we find mixed evidence concerning external validity, especially on health and nutrition behaviors.
Behavior Working Group
Du 23/03/2017 de 11:00 à 11:45
Room R1-14, Jourdan
ETILÉ Fabrice(PSE)
YIN Rémi(PSE)
Personal Identity and Preferences: measurement issues and lab experiment
Football et sciences sociales : les footballeurs entre institutions et marchés
Du 22/03/2017 de 18:00 à 19:30
Salle R2-07, campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
GOMEZ Monica (PSE)
Investissement et diplomatie: Quelle stratégie de la Chine en matière de football
Economic History Seminar
Du 22/03/2017 de 12:30 à 14:00
Campus Jourdan (nouveau bâtiment) R2-20
YANG Li (ZEW Mannheim and WIL)
Scar of Taiping : The Long-Term Development Impact of the Taiping Rebellion (1851-1864)
Du 22/03/2017
PSI-PSE (Petit Séminaire Informel de la Paris School of Economics) Seminar
Du 21/03/2017 de 17:00 à 18:00
CRESPIN-BOUCAUD Juliette (PSE)
Interethnic marriages in Africa
Paris Migration Seminar
Du 21/03/2017 de 15:00 à 19:00
CEPII, Salle Delors (2nd floor), 15h-19h
RAPOPORT Hillel()
EDO Anthony(CEPII)
VERDUGO Grégory(Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne)
STUHLER Jan(Iniversity Carlos III Madrid)
Mini-workshop on The Labor Market Effects of Immigration
15:00 – 17:00
Paper 1: Jan Stuhler (University Carlos III Madrid)
“Shift-Share Instruments and the Impact of Immigration” (with Joakim Ruist and David Jaeger)
Discussant: Elie Murard (IZA)
Paper 2: Grégory Verdugo (CES, University Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne)
“Moving Up or Down? Immigration and the Selection of Natives across Occupations and Locations” (with Javier Ortega
Discussant: Biagio Speciale (PSE-Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne)
17:30 – 19:30
Paper 1: Anthony Edo (CEPII)
“The Impact of French Repatriates from Algeria on Wage Dynamics”
Discussant: Ekrame Boubtane (CERDI)
Paper 2: Hillel Rapoport (PSE-Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne and CEPII)
“Minimum Wages and the Labor Market Effects of Immigration” (with Anthony Edo)
Discussant: Laurine Martinoty (CES, University Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne)
Paris Migration Seminar
Du 21/03/2017 de 15:00 à 19:00
CEPII, Salle Delors, 2nd floor
RAPOPORT Hillel()
EDO Anthony(CEPII)
VERDUGO Grégory(Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne)
STUHLER Jan(Iniversity Carlos III Madrid)
Mini-workshop on « The Labor Market Effects of Immigration »
Texte intégral
Paris Trade Seminar
Du 21/03/2017 de 14:30 à 16:00
Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris, salle R2-21
CROWLEY Meredith (U. of Cambridge)
Decomposing Exchange Rate Pass Through: Evidence from Chinese Exporters
écrit avec Lu Han and Huasheng Song
Applied Economics Lunch Seminar
Du 21/03/2017 de 12:30 à 13:30
Salle R1-09, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
STEGER Thomas (Leipzig University)
Das House-Kapital: A Long Term Housing & Macro Model
écrit avec Volker Grossmann (University of Fribourg)
Régulation et Environnement
Du 21/03/2017 de 12:00 à 14:00
Salle R1-15, Nouveau Bâtiment, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
ITO Koichiro (Harris School of Public Policy, University of Chicago)
Information Frictions, Inertia, and Selection on Elasticity: A Field Experiment on Electricity Tariff Choice
Roy Seminar (ADRES)
Du 20/03/2017 de 17:00 à 18:30
Salle R1-15, Nouveau Bâtiment, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
CANTILLON Estelle (Université Libre de Bruxelles)
Respecting priorities versus respecting preferences in school choice: When is there a trade-off?
Casual Friday Development Seminar - Brown Bag Seminar
Du 17/03/2017 de 12:45 à 13:45
Salle R2-20 (Nouveau bâtiment), Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 7514 Paris
SCHMUTZ Benoit (Crest,IPP,Polytechnique)
Intragovernmental conflict and media censorship: evidence from newspaper reports of corruption scandals in China
Macroeconomics Seminar
Du 16/03/2017 de 15:45 à 17:00
Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris, salle R2-20
KARADI Peter (European Central Bank)
*Rescheduled to a date yet to be confirmed
TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar
Du 16/03/2017 de 13:00 à 14:00
Salle R1-11, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
JEHIEL Philippe (PSE)
Investigation with forgetful liars
Abstract:
I consider environments in which an individual not telling the truth does not remember which lie he made and I propose modelling how such an individual forms a belief about his past lie using the apparatus of the analogy-based expectation equilibrium so that after performing a lie the individual considers that he lied according to the aggregate distribution of lie performed in equilibrium across all possible observations that the individual may possible make. I study the extent to which how asking subjects several times about their information and committing to harsh punishments in case of contradiction allows to elicit information and implement the first-best ouctome. Various extensions allowing for a mix of rational and forgetful liars are considered.
Travail et économie publique externe
Du 16/03/2017 de 13:00 à 14:30
Salle R2-07, Nouveau Bâtiment, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
STANTCHEVA Stefanie (Harvard University)
A SIMPLER THEORY OF OPTIMAL CAPITAL TAXATION
écrit avec Emmanuel SAEZ
Behavior seminar
Du 16/03/2017 de 12:00 à 13:00
Salle R2-01, Nouveau Bâtiment, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
BOMMIER Antoine (ETH Zürich)
Empirical identification of time preferences: Theory and an illustration using convex time budgets
écrit avec Bruno Lanz
Development Economics Seminar
Du 15/03/2017 de 16:30 à 18:00
Salle R2-01, campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 paris
RYAN Nicolas (Yale University)
Is There An Energy-Eciency Gap? Experimental Evidence from Indian Manufacturing Plants
Abstract
Climate policy pushes energy-eciency investments as a means to reduce energy consump-
tion, and thus greenhouse gas emissions, in developing countries. I report the results of
a large eld experiment among energy-intensive Indian manufacturing plants that o ered
information and skilled labor to encourage energy-eciency investments and practices.
Treatment plants invest small amounts in recommended energy-eciency measures; in-
crease physical eciency for some systems; increase capacity utilization across the board;
hire more skilled labor; and invest more in other capital improvements. This suite of
changes looks like modernization|a shift towards higher-skill, more capital-intensive plant
production. The net e ect of modernization on both energy consumption and productivity
are roughly zero, within the precision of my estimates. Plants that become more ecient
run more, which o sets any savings in energy. Similarly, treatment plants are estimated
to increase sales by a large (though statistically insigni cant) twelve percent, an amount
o set by the higher cost of their new input mix.
Economic History Seminar
Du 15/03/2017 de 12:30 à 14:00
Salle R1-14 (Nouveau bâtiment), Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
CAGE Julia (Sciences Po)
Payroll and inequality within the newsroom: evidence from France, 1936-2016
Applied Economics Lunch Seminar
Du 14/03/2017 de 12:30 à 13:30
Salle R1-09, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
ZHURAVSKAYA Ekaterina (PSE)
Middleman Minorities and Ethnic Violence: Anti-Jewish Pogroms in Eastern Europe
écrit avec Joint with Irena Grosfeld and Seyhun Orcan Sakalli
Abstract:
We present evidence to reconcile two seemingly contradictory observations: on the one hand, minorities often choose middleman occupations such as traders and creditors as a safeguard against violence; on the other hand, middleman minorities do become targets of persecution and ethnic violence. Using panel data on anti-Jewish pogroms in Eastern Europe between 1800 and 1939, we document that ethnic violence breaks out when income shocks hit at the times of a sharp increase in political uncertainty. In contrast, in times of a relative political stability, economic shocks do not instigate violence against middleman minorities. We also show that pogroms primarily affected localities where Jews dominated the credit sector as opposed to any other intermediary professions, including trade in agricultural or non-agricultural goods, suggesting that it is not the middlemen nature of the occupations of minorities that drove ethnic violence in times of economic and political crises, but the long-term character of the lending transactions.
GSIELM (Graduate Students International Economics and Labor Market) Lunch Seminar
Du 13/03/2017 de 13:00 à 14:00
MSE(106, Blv de l'Hôpital, salle S/19) 75013 Paris
GIGOUT Timothée (Banque de France)
*
Régulation et Environnement
Du 13/03/2017 de 12:00 à 14:00
Salle R2-20, Nouveau Bâtiment, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
GAUTHIER Stéphane(PSE)
BEZIN Emeline()
Profit taxation and production efficiency
écrit avec Guy Laroque (Sciences-Po, University College London and Institute for Fiscal Studies)
Stéphane Gauthier: Profit taxation and production efficiency. Ecrit avec Guy Laroque (Sciences-Po, University College London and Institute for Fiscal Studies).
Emeline Bezin: An economic theory of green consumer culture and sustainable technological change
Casual Friday Development Seminar - Brown Bag Seminar
Du 10/03/2017 de 12:00 à 13:45
Salle R2-20, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
RUDDER Jessica (UC Davis, PSE)
*
Macroeconomics Seminar
Du 09/03/2017 de 16:30 à 17:45
Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan 75014 Paris, salle R1-09
REIS Ricardo (London School of Economics)
*
brown bag Travail et Économie Publique
Du 09/03/2017 de 13:00 à 14:00
Salle R2-07, Nouveau Bâtiment, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
BEHAGHEL Luc (PSE)
Next please! Estimating the effect of treatments allocated by randomized waiting lists
écrit avec Clément de Chaisemartin
Oversubscribed treatments are often allocated by randomized waiting lists. Applicants
are ordered randomly, and treatment offers are made following that order. Upon receiving
an offer, applicants can either accept it or decline it. Offers stop when all the seats for
treatment have been filled. We refer to applicants that accept their offer as takers.
We start by showing that there is a correlation between receiving an offer and being a
taker, because offers continue until sufficiently many applicants have accepted their offer.
Therefore, receiving an offer cannot be used as an instrument to estimate the effect of
the treatment. We then show how one can solve this problem by downweighting takers
that receive an offer. Based on this result, we propose a new estimator of the effect of the
treatment, and we show that it is consistent. We review recent articles using randomized
waiting lists to estimate treatment effects, and we show that the most commonly used
estimator is not consistent. Finally, we use our estimator to revisit Behaghel et al. (2017).
TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar
Du 09/03/2017 de 13:00 à 14:00
salle R1-11, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
GOMES RENATO (TSE)
Drip Prices and Missed Sales
écrit avec joint with TIROLE Jean
Abstract: Firms often sell a basic good as well as ancillary ones.
Hold-up concerns have led to regulations on ancillary good pricing
such as price transparency and caps on the add-on price. The hold-up
narrative, however, is an inaccurate description of many retail
settings in which add-ons are offered below cost (e.g. free shipping),
and of the infrequent card surcharging in countries where the
“no-surcharge rule” was lifted.
We argue that the key to unifying these conflicting narratives is the
seller’s concern about losing sales on the basic good. When the
ancillary good is self-supplied (or equivalently supplied by a
competitive upstream ancillary-good industry) and consumers are
well-informed about prices (attentive or repeat customers), the firm
passes through the cost of the ancillary good to the consumer if the
(endogenous) markup on the basic good is small, but absorbs partly or
fully any ancillary good cost increase if this markup is high, so as
not to run the risk of losing sales. The ancillary good is always sold
below cost. When the ancillary good is provided by a supplier with
market power, the latter has an incentive to jack up the intermediate
price so as to benefit from the seller’s cost absorption strategy. We
show that the optimal regulation is a price floor on the ancillary
good, equal to the intermediate price. We also show that absent
regulation, there is an overprovision of the ancillary good when the
ancillary good is supplied by a two-sided platform.
When consumers are initially unaware of the ancillary good price, the
price of the basic good acts as a signal of the ancillary good price:
A high price for the basic good makes the firm more wary of missed
sales and thus reassures the consumer about the ancillary good price.
We study the optimal regulation
PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group
Du 09/03/2017 de 12:00 à 13:30
salle R2-21, Campus Jourdan, 75014 Paris
PANDE Rohini (Yale)
A préciser.
Behavior seminar
Du 09/03/2017 de 12:00 à 13:00
Salle R2-01 Nouveau Bâtiment, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
BRAMOULLÉ Yann (Ecole d'Economie d'Aix-Marseille)
Hiring through Networks: Favors or Information
écrit avec kenan Huremovic
In many different contexts, connected candidates are more likely to be hired or promoted than unconnected ones. This may be due to favoritism or better information on candidates' abilities. Attempts at identifiying both effects have generally relied on productivity measures collected after hiring. In this paper, we develop a new method to identify favors and information from data on hiring. Under natural assumptions, we show that observable characteristics have a lower impact on the probability to be hired for connected candidates and that this reduction precisely captures the information effect. We then show how to recover biases due to favors from overall shifts in hiring probabilities. We apply this new method on data on academic promotions in Spain. We find weak evidence of information effects and strong evidence of favoritism. These results are consistent with those obtained from later productivities.
Economic History Seminar
Du 08/03/2017 de 12:30 à 14:00
Salle R2-20, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
LEVY John ()
The 'Capital' in Capitalism
This talk surveys various approaches to the study of capitalism, exploring relative emphases upon the investment function. Drawing from Keynes’s writings on liquidity preference, the goal is explain why the history of capitalism since 1945 demands special attention to the investment function, what kinds of analyses such attention demands, and what insights about the economic past it might possibly yield.
PSI-PSE (Petit Séminaire Informel de la Paris School of Economics) Seminar
Du 07/03/2017 de 17:00 à 18:00
HE Yinghua (Rice U)
Absence, Substitutability and Productivity: Evidence from Teachers
Paris Seminar in Demographic Economics
Du 07/03/2017 de 16:30 à 19:30
Palais Brongniart
LETURCQ Marion(INED)
WALDFOGEL Jane(Columbia University)
PANICO Lidia(INED)
Too many children left behind. The U.S. achievement gap in comparative perspective
- Jane Waldfogel (Columbia U.), Too many children left behind. The U.S. achievement gap in comparative perspective
- Lidia Panico and Marion Leturcq (INED), The long-term effects of parental separation on childhood financial poverty and multidimensional deprivation: A lifecourse approach
Paris Trade Seminar
Du 07/03/2017 de 14:30 à 16:00
MSE,106, Blv de l'Hôpital, 75013 Paris, salle du 6ème étage
CHANEY Thomas (Sciences Po)
Trade, Merchants, and the Lost Cities of the Bronze Age
écrit avec Gojko Barjamovic, Kerem Cosar, Ali Hortacsu
Applied Economics Lunch Seminar
Du 07/03/2017 de 12:30 à 13:30
salle R2-20, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
HOUNGBONON Georges (TSE-IDEI)
Winners or Losers from Broadband Internet
écrit avec Julienne LIANG (Orange)
Skill-biased technological change is identified as one of the drivers of worsening in-equality and unemployment in high-income countries. However, not all technologies are skill-biased. In this paper, we investigate the effects of fixed broadband Internet adoption on income inequality and employment in France. Using a unique town-level data, we find that broadband adoption raises income, lowers within-town inequality, particularly when the adoption rate reaches a critical mass of 30%, but widens the income gap between towns. Furthermore, broadband adoption has no significant effect on unemployment rate, but comes with jobs creation and destruction in specific economic sectors. These results are robust to the estimation strategy, and accord well with the findings of previous studies. In particular, our estimates imply that 10% increase in broadband penetration raises gross national income per capita by 2%, very close to existing cross-country estimates.
Roy Seminar (ADRES)
Du 06/03/2017 de 17:00 à 18:30
Salle E001, RDC Bâtiment E, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
ELLIOTT Robert (Burmingham)
Endogenous Financial Networks: Efficient Modularity and Why Shareholders Prevent It
We consider systemic risk in financial networks, by examining the conflict of interest between debt- and equity-holders. Through trading, banks can diversify their idiosyncratic risks and avoid failures following small shocks. However, the resulting interdependencies can cause multiple failures after large shocks. A social planner resolves this trade-off by creating a modular network structure with fire breaks, thereby preventing failures from small shocks while containing contagion. Socially efficient networks favor debt-holders over equity holders, meaning equity-holders can profitably trade away from these networks. Moreover, profitable trades for equity holders align their counter-parties’ failures with their own, creating systemic risk.
Régulation et Environnement
Du 06/03/2017 de 12:00 à 14:00
Salle 8, RDC Bâtiment G, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
ARMSTRONG Mark (University of Oxford)
Ordered Consumer Search
Casual Friday Development Seminar - Brown Bag Seminar
Du 03/03/2017 de 12:45 à 13:45
Campus Jourdan - bâitment A - rdc - Salle A2
BEKKOUCHE Yasmine (PSE)
Primary School Quality in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Comparative Study of Primary School Systems in Ghana and Ivory Coast
Macroeconomics Seminar
Du 02/03/2017 de 16:30 à 17:45
Maison des Sciences Economiques, 6th floor conference room
BOCOLA Luigi ()
*A Model of Financial Crises in Open Economies
TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar
Du 02/03/2017 de 13:00 à 14:00
salle DSS, bâtiment B, Campus Jourdan, 75014 paris
TOMALA Tristan (HEC Paris)
Competitive Information Design. Work in progress.
écrit avec joint with Frédéric Koessler (PSE) and Marie Laclau (PSE).
Abstract.
We study games between n information designers, each of whom can perform a statistical experiment about a piece of information, the pieces being independent. They aim at persuading a decision-maker to take their most favorable action. For such games with discontinuous payoffs, we show that there exists a (sub-game perfect) equilibrium with either an infinite number of messages or randomization over finite statistical experiments. We characterize the equilibrium distributions of actions for rectangular games in which the optimization problem of the decision-maker is separable across designers. Rectangular games have a (sub-game perfect) equilibrium in pure strategies with a finite number of messages.
brown bag Travail et Économie Publique
Du 02/03/2017 de 13:00 à 14:00
Salle 10, RDC Bâtiment G, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
VAN EFFENTERRE Clémentine ( University of Toronto)
Do women want to work more or more regularly? Evidence from a natural experiment
écrit avec Emma Duchini (Warwick University)
This paper studies women's employment decisions when institutions limit their chances of having a regular working schedule. Since 1972, French children in kindergarten and primary school had no school on Wednesday. In 2013, a reform reallocates some classes to Wednesday morning. A descriptive analysis of the pre-reform period suggests that women value flexibility when children demand it. Importantly, we observe that women's decision to stay at home on Wednesday hinges on the interplay between the cost of flexibility associated with their occupation, their bargaining power at work, and their role in the household. Next, we take advantage of the 2013 reform to obtain the first estimate of women's elasticity to the value of flexibility. To measure mothers' response we exploit variation in the implementation of this policy over time and across the age of the youngest child. Our results show that, although mothers do not increase their total weekly hours of work, they do take advantage of the fall in the value of flexibility to close 1/3 of their initial gap in the probability of working on Wednesday with respect to the control group. This response is driven by mothers who are more rewarded for a regular presence at work, but also by those who have a stronger bargaining power.
Behavior seminar
Du 02/03/2017 de 12:00 à 13:00
Salle A2, RDC Bâtiment A, Campus Jourdan, 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris
DOYLE Joseph (MIT Sloan School of Management)
Can Early Intervention Improve Maternal Well-being? Evidence from a Randomized Controlled Trial
This study estimates the effect of a targeted early childhood intervention program on global and experienced measures of maternal well-being utilizing a randomized controlled trial design. The primary aim of the intervention is to improve children’s school readiness skills by working directly with parents to improve their knowledge of child development and parenting behavior. One potential externality of the program is well-being benefits for parents given its direct focus on improving parental coping, self-efficacy, and problem solving skills, as well as generating an indirect effect on parental well-being by targeting child developmental problems. Participants from a socio-economically disadvantaged community are randomly assigned during pregnancy to an intensive 5-year home visiting parenting program or a control group. We estimate and compare treatment effects on multiple measures of global and experienced well-being using permutation testing to account for small sample size and a stepdown procedure to account for multiple testing. The intervention has no impact on global well-being as measured by life satisfaction and parenting stress or experienced negative affect using episodic reports derived from the Day Reconstruction Method (DRM). Treatment effects are observed on measures of experienced positive affect derived from the DRM and a measure of mood yesterday. The limited treatment effects suggest that early intervention programs may produce some improvements in experienced positive well-being, but no effects on negative aspects of well-being. Different findings across measures may result as experienced measures of well-being avoid the cognitive biases that impinge upon global assessments.
Development Economics Seminar
Du 01/03/2017 de 17:00 à 18:30
Campus Jourdan, bâtiment G, rez-de-chaussée, salle 10
JAYACHANDRAN Seema ()
Environmental externalities and intrahousehold inefficiencies
When consumption generates negative externalities, raising the price to reflect the social cost of consumption is the preferred policy solution. In some cases – for example, household water and electricity use – consumption is susceptible to a second externality problem: each individual enjoys the private benefits of consumption but shares the costs with other household members, leading to overconsumption even from the household's viewpoint. We test the prediction that intrahousehold inefficiency dampens price sensitivity in the context of piped water use in urban Zambia, combining billing records, randomized price variation, and lab-experimental measures of intrahousehold efficiency. We find that households with above-median efficiency have a short-run price elasticity that is three times higher than that of households with below-median efficiency. These results suggest that when individual-level consumption is difficult to observe and usage is billed at the household level, the required Pigouvian price will need to be set to correct both the environmental and the intrahousehold externalities. Alternative policies such as price incentives targeted toward the primary water-using household members or access to real-time data on household water consumption (which would improve the enforceability of intrahousehold agreements) could also be useful.
Economic History Seminar
Du 01/03/2017 de 12:30 à 14:00
COGNEAU Denis (PSE)
Public Finance in the French Colonial Empire 1870-1970
écrit avec Yannick DUPRAZ and Sandrine MESPLE-SOMP - (Atelier Histoire Economique)
Du 01/03/2017 de 12:30 à 14:00