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Programme de la semaine


Liste des séminaires

Les séminaires mentionnés ici sont ouverts principalement aux chercheurs et doctorants et sont consacrés à des présentations de recherches récentes. Les enseignements, séminaires et groupes de travail spécialisés offerts dans le cadre des programmes de master sont décrits dans la rubrique formation.

Les séminaires d'économie

Applied Economics Lunch Seminar

Atelier Histoire Economique

Behavior seminar

Behavior Working Group

brown bag Travail et Économie Publique

Casual Friday Development Seminar - Brown Bag Seminar

Development Economics Seminar

Economic History Seminar

Economics and Complexity Lunch Seminar

Economie industrielle

EPCI (Economie politique du changement institutionnel) Seminar

Football et sciences sociales : les footballeurs entre institutions et marchés

GSIELM (Graduate Students International Economics and Labor Market) Lunch Seminar

Histoire des entreprises et de la finance

Industrial Organization

Job Market Seminar

Macro Retreat

Macro Workshop

Macroeconomics Seminar

NGOs, Development and Globalization

Paris Game Theory Seminar

Paris Migration Seminar

Paris Seminar in Demographic Economics

Paris Trade Seminar

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

PhD Conferences

Propagation Mechanisms

PSI-PSE (Petit Séminaire Informel de la Paris School of Economics) Seminar

Regional and urban economics seminar

Régulation et Environnement

RISK Working Group

Roy Seminar (ADRES)

Séminaire d'Economie et Psychologie

The Construction of Economic History Working Group

Theory Working Group

TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar

Travail et économie publique externe

WIP (Work in progress) Working Group

Les séminaires de sociologie, anthropologie, histoire et pluridisciplinaires

Casse-croûte socio

Déviances et contrôle social : Approche interdisciplinaire des déviances et des institutions pénales

Dispositifs éducatifs, socialisation, inégalités

La discipline au travail. Qu’est-ce que le salariat ?

Méthodes quantitatives en sociologie

Modélisation et méthodes statistiques en sciences sociales

Objectiver la souffrance

Sciences sociales et immigration

Archives d'économie

Accumulation, régulation, croissance et crise

Commerce international appliqué

Conférences PSE

Economie du travail et inégalités

Economie industrielle

Economie monétaire internationale

Economie publique et protection sociale

Groupe de modélisation en macroéconomie

Groupe de travail : Economie du travail et inégalités

Groupe de travail : Macroeconomic Tea Break

Groupe de travail : Risques

Health Economics Working Group

Journée de la Fédération Paris-Jourdan

Lunch séminaire Droit et Economie

Marché du travail et inégalités

Risques et protection sociale

Séminaire de Recrutement de Professeur Assistant

Seminaire de recrutement sénior

SemINRAire

Archives de sociologie, anthropologie, histoire et pluridisciplinaires

Conférence du Centre de Théorie et d'Analyse du Droit

Espace social des inégalités contemporaines. La constitution de l'entre-soi

Etudes halbwachsiennes

Familles, patrimoines, mobilités

Frontières de l'anthropologie

L'auto-fabrication des sociétés : population, politiques sociales, santé

La Guerre des Sciences Sociales

Population et histoire politique au XXe siècle

Pratiques et méthodes de la socio-histoire du politique

Pratiques quantitatives de la sociologie

Repenser la solidarité au 21e siècle

Séminaire de l'équipe ETT du CMH

Séminaire ethnographie urbaine

Sociologie économique

Terrains et religion


Calendrier du mois de septembre 2024

Programme de la semaine précédente Programme de la semaine Programme de la semaine suivante
(du 2024-06-03 au 2024-06-10)(du 2024-06-10 au 2024-06-16)(du 2024-06-16 au 2024-06-23)

Semaine du 2024-06-10 au 2024-06-16


Casual Friday Development Seminar - Brown Bag Seminar

Du 14/06/2024 de 13:00 à 14:00

R2-20

DIAZ Oscar Mauricio(PSE)
FERBER Tim(PSE)

Urbanization and infrastructure provision: Evidence from Dakar


Macroeconomics Seminar

Du 13/06/2024 de 16:00 à 17:15

PSE- 48 boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris, salle R1-15

BILAL Adrien (Harvard)

Unveiling the Macroeconomic Impact of Climate Change: Global vs. Local Temperature



écrit avec Diego Kanzig (Northwestern)




This paper estimates that the macroeconomic damages from climate change are at least three to five times larger than previously thought. We exploit natural variability in global temperature and rely on a time series approach. We find that a 1C increase in global temperature leads to a 12% decline in world GDP. We document that global temperature shocks correlate much more strongly with extreme climatic events than country-level temperature shocks that the traditional panel literature relies on, explaining why our estimate is substantially larger. We then use our reduced-form results to estimate structural damage functions in a standard neoclassical growth model. A business as usual warming scenario implies a present value welfare loss of 32% and a Social Cost of Carbon of $772 per ton of carbon dioxide, several orders of magnitude above previous estimates.

Travail et économie publique externe

Du 13/06/2024 de 12:30 à 13:30

PSE- 48 boulevard Jourdan, 74014 Paris, salle R1-15

TIAN Lin (INSEAD)

Formation of Human Capital in Modern Economy



écrit avec Valerie Smeets and Sharon Traiberman




We study how the distribution of skills in the economy is shaped by students' choices over field of study. We develop a dynamic general equilibrium framework that incorporates both a labor market where workers differ in their field of study, and an education margin where students choose their fields in anticipation of future demand. Leveraging uniquely rich Danish administrative data, and features of the Danish university application system, we develop a methodology to jointly estimate students' field preferences and key labor market parameters, while allowing for latent heterogeneity in workers' skills and student preferences. We find that heterogeneity in how responsive students are to shocks, with some students being substantially more responsive than previous estimates. However, we also find that students cluster into several preference types over fields of study---e.g., STEM---so that they are only elastic across a subset of fields. We close the model and consider the general equilibrium consequences of globalization, as well as the effects of various labor market and education policies. We find that field of study explains 17% of the variation in labor market outcomes due to offshore shocks.

TOM (Théorie, Organisation et Marchés) Lunch Seminar

Du 13/06/2024 de 12:30 à 13:30

R2-20

BARDIER Pierre (PSE)

Unanimity of two-selves in decision making



écrit avec Pierre BARDIER, Bach DONG-XUAN, Van-Quy NGUYEN.




We propose a new model of incomplete preferences under uncertainty, which we call unanimous dual-self preferences. Act f is considered more desirable than act g when, and only when, both the evaluation of an optimistic self, computed as the welfare level attained in a best-case scenario, and that of a pessimistic self, computed as the welfare level attained in a worst-case scenario, rank f above g. Our comparison criterion involves multiple priors, as best and worst cases are determined among sets of probability distributions, and is, generically, less conservative than Bewley preferences and twofold multi-prior preferences, the two ambiguity models that are closest to ours.

PEPES (Paris Empirical Political Economics) Working Group

Du 13/06/2024 de 12:30 à 14:00

Room H405 at Sciences Po

AMBRA SECK Awa (Harvard)

En Route: The French Colonial Army, Emigration, and Development in Morocco





: Between 1830 and 1962, six million Africans living under colonial rule served in the French army. Most were deployed internationally to maintain order or fight French wars. After independence, all were repatriated and granted the right to move to France. We estimate the effect of military deploy- ment on the soldiers’ long-term outcomes, as well as on their communities of origin, using historical data on Moroccan soldiers, and exploiting the arbitrary assignment of troops to international locations. We show that, within a municipality, cohorts with a higher share of soldiers deployed to France were more likely to relocate there after independence. In contrast, deployment to other locations did not affect emigration. Consistent with the establishment of emigration networks, we find that the effects persist for decades after independence. Furthermore, communities with a higher share of soldiers deployed to France have experienced better economic outcomes and a shift from the agricultural to the service sector today. These results highlight the role that colonial rule played in shaping emigration networks from the colonies and in contributing to persistent changes in their patterns of economic development

Development Economics Seminar

Du 12/06/2024 de 16:30 à 18:00

R1-15

KOEHLER-DERRICK Gabriel (NYU Abu Dhabi)

Tribal Voting in New Democracies: Evidence from 6 Million Tunisian Voter Records





Do candidates who share a tribal identity with voters outperform candidates who do not? Considerable research has examined this question in the Middle East, but in many of these key cases autocratic regimes supported political institutions that reinforced tribal ties, making it hard to discern the independent effect of tribal identity on voter behavior. We revisit this question in (at the time) democratic Tunisia, where post-independence governments tried to uproot tribal identity, making it a “least likely” case to uncover tribal influence on election outcomes. To estimate the effect of tribal influence on voting, we match an historical dictionary of Tunisian tribes to surnames from the universe of both registered voters and candidates from Tunisia’s recent local elections (2018). We find preliminary evidence consistent with the claim that tribal affiliations do “matter:” lists whose candidates share a tribal identity with the underlying population consistently outperform lists who do not share this identity. Our work suggests that despite decades of policies designed to suppress tribes, tribal identity exerted a measurable effect on local politics during a period of democratic transition

Economic History Seminar

Du 12/06/2024 de 12:00 à 13:30

R1.09

MOSHRIF Rowaida (PSE)

Long-run Land inequality and Land Reform in Egypt (1896-2020)





This study focuses on the long-term evolution of land inequality in Egypt and assesses the redistributive role of the 1952 agrarian land reform. Using newly digitized data on landownership distribution since 1896, I provide the first long-term estimates of land inequality covering the late 19th century up to 2020. The findings indicate that land distribution was highly unequal in the first half of the 20th century, with the top 1% of landowners holding over 45% of total private agricultural land in Egypt. Of this, 25% of the land was owned by foreigners, while the rest belonged to Egyptian large landowners who were granted land by the Muhammed Ali dynasty in the 19th century. The 1952 agrarian land reform reduced land inequality by redistributing land from large landowners to small landowners. Specifically, the landownership share of the top 1% decreased from 43% to 28%, while the landownership of the bottom 90% rose from 27% to 42%. This redistribution was more substantial following the abolition of religious endowments, known as ”Waqf,” which were initially used by large landowners to preserve large properties from fragmentation through inheritance

Applied Economics Lunch Seminar

Du 11/06/2024 de 12:30 à 13:30

Salle R2.20

MO Zhexun ()

Enforcing Coercive Colonial Rule: Evidence from Head Tax and Blood Tax Levies in French West Africa



écrit avec Denis Cogneau




Colonial states were described either as overwhelming Leviathans or as administration on the cheap. We study two pillars of colonial rule in French West Africa: head tax collection and military conscription, using novel data at district level between 1919 and 1949. The compliance to head tax was strikingly high, and targets of military recruitment were met without difficulty. Higher tax rates were set in more affluent districts: more densely populated, closer to ports, with railways and producing cash crops. No such pattern applied to conscription, most likely because the labor drain was seen as small everywhere. Evidence suggests that tax increases were a source of conflict between colonizers and colonized. During the Great Depression, tax rates were kept stable and military recruitment was decreased, yet districts exporting cash crops whose prices had collapsed were not differentially treated. Likewise, the large drought that affected districts in the Sahel did not trigger any tax rebates or any lightening of forced recruitment. Colonial states were quite effective in enforcing their rule and not entirely blind to local conditions, yet were not able, if even willing, to fine-tune their policies over time.

Du 10/06/2024 de 17:00 à 13:30

R1-15

LIU Ce (Michigan State university)

*


Roy Seminar (ADRES)

Du 10/06/2024 de 17:00 à 18:30

R1-15

LIU Ce (Michigan State university)

Coalitions in Repeated Games





This paper develops a framework and solution concept for repeated interaction in which both individuals and coalitions may act. No party can commit to long-run behavior and each anticipates that behavior today influences continuation play. Across a range of settings, we evaluate the degree to which history-dependence deters individual and coalitional deviations

Régulation et Environnement

Du 10/06/2024 de 12:00 à 13:30

R1-15

CHAN Ron (Manchester University)

*