Calendrier du mois de septembre 2024
Programme de la semaine précédente | Programme de la semaine | Programme de la semaine suivante | |
(du 2024-02-12 au 2024-02-19) | (du 2024-02-19 au 2024-02-25) | (du 2024-02-25 au 2024-03-03) |
Semaine du 2024-02-19 au 2024-02-25 |
Du 23/02/2024 de 12:00 à 13:00
Salle R1.14
WALLOSSEK Luisa (University of Oslo)
The Marriage Earnings Gap
écrit avec with Elena Herold
What happens to earnings upon marriage? Linking administrative and survey data from Germany, we show that there is a marriage earnings gap. Even after accounting for the child penalty, women’s earnings drop by 20% after marriage. We show that the marriage earnings gap results from both the extensive margin (women stop working) and the intensive margin (women work fewer hours), but not from a decrease in hourly wages. Labor supply disincentives from joint taxation can explain about one third of the marriage earnings gap, while we find no effect for labor supply incentives from changes in divorce law. In addition to tax incentives, we show that gender norms are an important mechanism behind the marriage earnings gap.
Du 22/02/2024 de 16:00 à 17:00
R1.14
VAN MENXCEL Kevin()
PECHEU Vladimir()
*
PSI-PSE (Petit Séminaire Informel de la Paris School of Economics) Seminar
Du 20/02/2024 de 17:00 à 18:00
R1-13
ANDRé Loris (PSE)
Economic growth and biodiversity: a sectoral model
Applied Economics Lunch Seminar
Du 20/02/2024 de 12:30 à 13:30
Salle R2.21
REUTZEL Fabian (PSE)
Implicit Discrimination in Unemployment Benefits
écrit avec Hannah Illing and Jakob Wegmann
In this project we document how a wildly unknown interaction between the tax and transfer system results in an implicit discrimination of women. In Germany, the choice of withholding tax classes determines the level of unemployment benefit, so married couples can increase unemployment benefits for one partner at the expense of the other partner. We document that this mechanism is essentially unknown based on survey evidence. At the same time, more than 60% of the married couples shift unemployment benefits from one partner to the other. We show that this choice for households results in a substantial implicit gender discrimination along the whole income distribution. For example, for the median female income, the unemployment benefit for a married women are 6% smaller than for a married man with the same income. We estimate the effect of the German institutional setting on various outcomes and find a large heterogeneity in effect size particular with respect to partner income. Overall, we find that compared to a system without withholding tax class, women stay unemployed longer and find lower paying jobs, while men stay unemployed shorter and find better paying jobs. A reform of the withhold tax system allows us to abstract from choice of withholding tax classes and, hence, to isolate the effect of the unemployment benefits level.